Cyberspace:  The New Frontier for Housing Discrimination--An Analysis of the Conflict Between the Communications Decency Act and the Fair Housing Act by Ross, Lisa Marie
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 1 Fall 2009 pp.329-378 
Fall 2009 
Cyberspace: The New Frontier for Housing Discrimination--An 
Analysis of the Conflict Between the Communications Decency 
Act and the Fair Housing Act 
Lisa Marie Ross 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lisa Marie Ross, Cyberspace: The New Frontier for Housing Discrimination--An Analysis of the Conflict 
Between the Communications Decency Act and the Fair Housing Act, 44 Val. U. L. Rev. 329 (2009). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/9 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 329
CYBERSPACE:  THE NEW FRONTIER FOR 
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION—AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND THE 
FAIR HOUSING ACT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This is not in a trendy neighborhood—very Latino. 
Non-Women of Color NEED NOT APPLY. 
Christian single straight female needed.1 
Despite Congress’s enactment of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 
(“FHA”), which regulates housing discrimination, one need spend only a 
few minutes searching for housing via the Internet before finding blatant 
FHA violations, such as the listing above.  The FHA’s efforts to end 
egregious housing practices aimed at persons of a particular race or 
socioeconomic status has certainly had some success.  Nevertheless, 
those who wish to circumvent the FHA may now do so simply by using 
the Internet to disseminate discriminatory housing advertisements.  
Although more than forty years have passed since the civil rights 
movement, discrimination continues as was recently seen in 
advertisements stating racial preferences on websites designed to help 
Hurricane Katrina victims find housing.2 
As the Internet has quickly become a staple of mainstream society, 
one might be inclined to question how such blatant discrimination is 
permissible under the FHA.  In short, discrimination is not allowed 
under the FHA.  The prevailing judicial interpretation of the FHA is that 
liability for discriminatory housing advertisements falls both on the 
creator of the discriminatory words and the intermediary, such as the 
publisher of a newspaper or a housing pamphlet.3  If the FHA was the 
                                                 
1 These quotes were found on the Chicago Craigslist website and presented at trial in 
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 
685–86 (N.D. Ill. 2006), a’ffd, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that an online listing 
service was not liable for discriminatory housing advertisements posted on its website by 
third-party users of the service). 
2 Infra note 24 (noting that in a December 2005 hearing before the House of 
Representatives about housing discrimination after Hurricane Katrina, the executive 
director of the Fair Housing Action Center reported receiving more than two hundred 
discrimination complaints).  A key provision of the FHA prohibits advertising that 
expresses preference for or limitations on a potential buyer or renter based on “race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006). 
3 Infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing several cases in which intermediaries 
were found liable for FHA violations). 
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sole operating law governing discriminatory online housing 
advertisements, the owner or operator of an online listing service could 
likely be held liable for discriminatory housing advertisements posted on 
his or her website, even if the posts were generated by a third party.4  
The Communications Decency Act of 1995 (“CDA”) has a “Good 
Samaritan” provision (“Good Samaritan provision”) that operates 
contrary to the stated goals of the FHA.5 
The Good Samaritan provision has been interpreted to insulate 
online intermediaries from liability for discriminatory comments made 
by third parties.  Although congressional documentation indicates that 
this immunity provision was designed to protect interactive computer 
services that attempt to screen offensive content and to prevent an 
onslaught of online defamation litigation, the Seventh and Ninth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have held the CDA may also be used to immunize 
interactive computer services from FHA violations perpetrated by users 
of their websites and forums.6  This Note proposes a textual revision to 
the CDA that would prevent interactive computer services from 
escaping liability for FHA violations contained in third-party user 
postings on their websites. 
Part II of this Note provides a comprehensive review of the conflict 
between the CDA and the FHA.7  Next, Part III of this Note provides an 
in-depth analysis of the discourse between the CDA and the FHA, the 
                                                 
4 Infra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (illustrating how the FHA extends liability to 
the intermediaries of discriminatory housing advertisements and citing cases where 
publishers of newspapers, listing services, and advertising brochures were held liable for 
discriminatory advertisements generated by third parties). 
5 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).  This provision of the CDA is entitled “Protection for 
‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material” and prevents interactive 
computer services from being held liable for screening objectionable content on their 
websites and forums.  Id. 
6 Infra Part II.D (explaining the Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions in depth).  See 141 
CONG. REC. H8471–73 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).  Representative Cox, 
a co–sponsor of the bill that created the Good Samaritan provision, stated: 
Currently, however, there is a tremendous disincentive for online 
service providers to create family friendly services by detecting and 
removing objectionable content.  These providers face the risk of 
increased liability where they take reasonable steps to police their 
systems.  A New York judge recently sent the online services the 
message to stop policing by ruling that Prodigy was subject to a $200 
million libel suit simply because it did exercise some control over 
profanity and indecent material. 
Id. at H8471. 
7 Infra Part II.A (explaining the history and interpretation of the FHA); infra Part II.B–C 
(describing the development and operation of the Internet and discussing the creation and 
interpretation of the CDA); infra Part II.D (examining how the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
have dealt with the textual conflict between the CDA and the FHA). 
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questionable existence of a circuit split, the adverse effects of the CDA’s 
current application, and the proposed solutions to the conflict.8  Finally, 
Part IV of this Note proposes a resolution to the conflict that amends the 
CDA to eliminate all exceptions to the FHA and tailors the text of the 
CDA’s Good Samaritan provision to apply to only those instances in 
which Congress intended immunity to apply, such as when an 
interactive service provider is treated as a publisher of third-party 
generated defamation or when the service has made a good faith attempt 
to screen “offensive” content on its website or user forums.9 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Before analyzing the issues surrounding the tension between the 
CDA and the FHA, a working knowledge of the Internet and an 
understanding of the statutes at the heart of the conflict is needed.10  
First, Section A highlights the development of the FHA, focusing on the 
advertising provision laid out in Section 3604(c) of the FHA.11  Then, 
Section B provides a brief history of the Internet’s development and 
operation, including an overview of federalism and jurisdictional issues 
that a court may face before it can decide an Internet-related action on 
the merits.12  Next, Section C introduces the CDA by discussing the New 
York case leading to its creation, its legislative history, and key statutory 
interpretations of the CDA by the federal circuit and district courts.13  
Finally, Section D discusses two major cases where the FHA’s expansive 
imposition of liability for discriminatory advertisements directly 
                                                 
8 Infra Part III.A (considering whether the analytical differences between the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuit opinions constitute a circuit split and suggesting the potential outcome if 
the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in a case where an online 
intermediary used the CDA to claim immunity for third party FHA violations); infra Part 
III.B (addressing the major pitfalls of the CDA’s current application, including its 
evisceration of a pertinent section of the FHA, its tendency to support a do-nothing 
mentality among interactive computer services, its inconsistency with congressional intent, 
and its ability to prevent victims of housing discrimination from seeking relief); infra Part 
III.C (presenting the solutions posed by other scholars and addressing the strengths and 
weaknesses of each one, culminating in a call for a textual revision to the CDA). 
9 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006) (entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material”). 
10 Infra Part II (providing the framework for understanding the conflict between the 
FHA and the CDA). 
11 Infra Part II.A (discussing the history and development of the FHA). 
12 Infra Part II.B (providing a history of the Internet and special issues inherent to 
Internet-related cases). 
13 Infra Part II.C (tracing the CDA from its inception through the courts prior to Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) 
and Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th 
Cir. 2008)). 
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conflicted with the interactive computer service immunity provided by 
the CDA.14 
A. Development of the Fair Housing Act 
One commentator described residential segregation as taking effect 
“slowly and deliberately” after the turn of the Twentieth Century, with 
the urban ghetto developing after World Wars I and II when African 
Americans began moving into industrialized areas.15  Even prominent 
and successful African American figures, such as Nat King Cole, were 
victims of racially based housing discrimination.16  After race-restrictive 
covenants were declared unconstitutional, African Americans who 
bought or rented homes in white neighborhoods were given an icy 
reception, often accompanied by violence.17 
                                                 
14 Infra Part II.D (discussing in depth the Roommate and Craigslist holdings and 
rationales). 
15 Mark Seitles, Note, The Reputation of Residential Racial Segregation in America:  Historical 
Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 89, 91 (1998) (briefly discussing race relations in America prior to the 1900s).  
Others have traced the roots of housing segregation in the United States as far back as the 
middle nineteenth century.  DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 289 (2004).  
While a small number of African Americans owned homes in expensive neighborhoods 
during the nineteenth century, many lived in crowded ghettos with derogatory nicknames, 
such as “Nigger Hill” or “Little Africa.”  Id.  The living conditions in these ghettos affected 
mortality rates as the potential for disease exposure and malnutrition was significantly 
higher in these areas than in other communities.  Id. at 289–90.  Some African Americans 
lived in “cold and exposed rooms and garrets, board shanties, five and six feet high, and as 
many feet square . . . without any comforts, save the bare floor, with the cold penetrating 
between the boards.”  Id. at 290 (internal citation omitted).  “Ghetto” in this Note is used as 
it was by the National Advisory Commission on Disorders and is defined as “an area 
within a city characterized by poverty and acute social disorganization, and inhabited by 
members of a racial or ethnic group under conditions of involuntary segregation.”  Report 
of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 25 (1968) available at 
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
16 Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting Civil Rights and Free Speech on 
the Internet:  The Fair Housing Act vs. The Communications Decency Act, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 805, 810 (2007).  Kurth described Nat King Cole’s housing experience: 
In August, 1948, popular music star Nat King Cole purchased an estate 
in a wealthy Los Angeles neighborhood with his wife and children.  
The Property Owners Association of the neighborhood expressed 
prejudice against the wealthy, cultured and sophisticated black 
singer’s presence in their community, and they tried to buy the home 
back from him at a profit.  Cole declined the offer and asserted his 
rights to move into his home, only to be terrorized by his white 
neighbors, who planted signs that said “Nigger Heaven” on his 
property and burned the word “Nigger” into his front lawn. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
17 See BELL, supra note 15, at 290.  See also Thomas J. Sugrue, The Unfinished History of 
Racial Segregation, POVERTY & RACE, July 15, 2008, http://www.prrac.org/projects/ 
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In 1967, a study on racial violence, which was commissioned by 
President Lyndon Johnson, found that segregated housing greatly 
contributed to the volatile nature of large cities and “[d]iscrimination 
prevents access to many non-slum areas, particularly the suburbs, where 
good housing exists.”18  Within a year, Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, which included Section 3604(c) of the FHA.19  Section 3604(c) 
                                                                                                             
fair_housing_commission/chicago/sugrue.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).  “Whites 
protested, picketed and used violence to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods, to prevent 
the construction of racially-integrated public housing projects in their communities, and to 
resist the development of affordable housing open to minorities.”  Id.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1 (1948) was considered a victory in the fight for desegregated housing.  Kurth, 
supra note 16, at 808.  In Shelley, a white property owner sold his home to an African 
American family in violation of a race restrictive covenant.  334 U.S. at 1.  A disgruntled 
neighbor sought enforcement of the covenant against the African American family, but the 
Court refused and concluded that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant 
violated the state action doctrine and would violate the defendants’ right to equal 
protection.  Id. at 20. 
18 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 23 (1968), 
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).  In 
1967, following an explosion of racially motivated disturbances in American cities, 
President Johnson established a commission to investigate three issues:  what transpired in 
those American cities; what factors contributed to the discourses; and what preventative 
measures America should take.  Id. at 1.  In its research, the commission visited the riot 
cities and spoke with witnesses and experts, finding that “[o]ur nation [was] moving 
toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”  Id.  Furthermore, the 
commission found that federal housing programs were not performing as effectively as 
predicted.  Id. at 23.  Specifically, the commission noted that: 
To date, federal programs have been able to do comparatively little to 
provide housing for the disadvantaged.  In the 31-year history of 
subsidized federal housing, only about 800,000 units have been 
constructed, with recent production averaging about 50,000 units a 
year.  By comparison, over a period only three years longer, FHA 
insurance guarantees have made possible the construction of over ten 
million middle and upper-income units. 
Id. at 24.  The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders posited several 
recommendations to improve housing discrimination, including developing “a 
comprehensive and enforceable federal open housing law to cover the sale or rental of all 
housing, including single family homes.”  Id.  Other suggestions included a five-year plan 
to bring more low and moderate income housing within reach of African Americans and 
restructuring assistance programs to locate such housing away from the ghettos.  Id. 
19 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006).  The statute states “[i]t is the policy of the United 
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United 
States.”  Id. § 3601.  The provision regarding advertising of housing states: 
[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be 
made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, 
with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any 
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to 
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 
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was intended to eliminate the special dangers posed by discriminatory 
housing advertisements, such as psychological harm and stigmatic 
effects.20 
A plain reading of Section 3604(c) suggests that publishers are liable 
to anyone who creates or transmits a discriminatory housing 
advertisement.21  In other words, it makes publishing a discriminatory 
advertisement a distinct and actionable wrong separate from the creation 
of the advertisement.22  The “Mrs. Murphy exemption” is the only 
                                                                                                             
Id. § 3604(c).  The term “dwelling” as used in Section 3604(c) means:  “any building, 
structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy 
as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or 
lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion 
thereof.”  Id. § 3602(b). 
20 Id.  One writer stated that Section 3604(c) “works to prevent the substantial stigma, 
humiliation, and other emotional injuries caused by encountering discriminatory 
preferences or exclusions.”  Jennifer C. Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace:  
The Implications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 969, 975–76 (2002).  Another commentator recounted a psychological study conducted 
in the 1940s where African American school children were asked to choose between a black 
doll and a white doll in response to a series of questions.  Kurth, supra note 16, at 814–15.  
African American school children across the country chose the white doll when asked 
which one they liked better and which one was prettier, but they chose the black doll when 
asked which one “looks bad.”  Id. at 814.  Section 3604(c) also promotes community 
diversity and helps encourage the dissemination of accurate information about the law.  
Chang, supra, at 974–76. Chang presents the following hypothetical situation:   
For example, a housing consumer faced with numerous notices 
specifying “no kids” might conclude that discrimination against 
families with children is permissible in all cases.  Such miseducation of 
the public further frustrates fair housing efforts, which rely heavily on 
private complainants who identify illegal housing practices.  Unless 
housing consumers are aware of their rights, they will not be alert to 
violations of those rights. 
Id. at 976–77. 
21 Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, HOUSINGDISCRIMINATION.COM?:  The Ninth 
Circuit (Mostly) Puts Out the Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against Roommate-
Matching Websites, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 329, 335 (2008) (providing an explanation of 
publisher liability as it pertains to the FHA). Klien and Doskow note: 
The law expands the class of those held legally responsible for non-
discrimination in housing to include not just housing providers, but 
those who publish their advertisements . . . [u]nder the FHA, the 
“actual wrongdoers” are not limited to those who “originate the 
allegedly unlawful content”—by writing and placing the ads—but also 
those who publish them. 
Id. 
22 James D. Shanahan, Note, Rethinking the Communications Decency Act:  Eliminating 
Statutory Protections of Discriminatory Housing Advertisements on the Internet, 60 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 135, 136 (2007) (arguing that the FHA holds publishers responsible for third–party 
content).  Shanahan explains: 
The 1968 [FHA] protects the supply of housing for those who may 
otherwise be discriminated against and functions to reduce overall 
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loophole allowing for discrimination in housing under the FHA and 
explicitly bars the exemption from applying to the advertising provision 
in Section 3604(c).23  Federal district and circuit courts have liberally 
applied Section 3604(c) to many media outlets in order to impose liability 
for publishing discriminatory housing advertisements.24  That said, a 
                                                                                                             
discrimination in the housing market.  The plain language of the 
statute indicates that it is intended to prevent newspapers and other 
publishing media from publishing classified advertisements that 
mention statutorily proscribed preferences in the sale or rental of a 
dwelling.  The FHA holds publishers of discriminatory advertisements 
legally responsible for content provided by third parties. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
23  The “Mrs. Murphy exemption” is a nickname for Section 3603(b), which provides that: 
[n]othing in section 3604 of this title (other than subsection (c)) shall 
apply to . . . rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters 
occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families 
living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and 
occupies one of such living quarters as his residence. 
42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2).   The nickname was derived because the original draft did not leave 
room for people such as Mrs. Murphy, a woman who did not want to rent her 
boardinghouse to African Americans.  James D. Walsh, Note, Reaching Mrs. Murphy:  A Call 
for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
605, 607–08 (1999).  Some commentators have referred to the Mrs. Murphy exemption as “a 
loophole big enough to drive a Mack truck full of roommate-seekers through.”  Klein & 
Doskow, supra note 21, at 334. 
24 See Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding a newspaper 
liable under the FHA for publishing housing advertisements that depicted only whites as 
homeowners); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972) (stating “the 
congressional prohibition of discriminatory advertisements was intended to apply to 
newspapers as well as any other publishing medium”); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood 
Coal. v. Jenna Resales Co., 447 F. Supp. 838, 842 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that a listing 
service falls clearly within the scope of the FHA’s expansive liability); Saunders v. Gen. 
Serv. Corp., 659 F. Supp 1042, 1057–59 (E.D. Va. 1987) (holding that an advertising brochure 
violated Section 3604(c) because it did not contain an Equal Housing Opportunity logo nor 
feature an adequate number of African American models in its pictures).  One 
commentator argues that Section 3604(c)’s expansive language has not deterred housing 
discrimination, which is evident from the blatant housing discrimination in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina.  Stephen Collins, Comment, Saving Fair Housing on the Internet:  The Case 
for Amending the Communications Decency Act, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1491 (2008).  In a 
hearing before the House of Representatives concerning housing options for Hurricane 
Katrina victims, the executive director of the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action 
Center reported that he had received more than two hundred complaints about housing 
discrimination since the hurricane hit.  Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Cmty. Opportunity of the House Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 70 (2006) (statement of David E. Garratt) available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid 
=f:26753.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).  The director brought twenty-eight pages worth of 
discriminatory statements from websites, such as Katrinahousing.org, Katrinahome.com, 
DHRonline, and reliefwelcomewagon.com.  Id.  A sample of the discriminatory statements 
included:  ‘‘I would love to house a single mom with one child, not racist, but white only’’; 
‘‘Not to sound racist, but because we want to make things more understandable for our 
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broad application of Section 3604(c) is at odds with the immunity 
provided by the CDA because the FHA extends liability to 
intermediaries.25  To shed additional light on the issue, Section B explains 
the CDA and highlights some of the jurisdictional issues that may arise 
regarding its application in an Internet-related housing discrimination 
case.26 
B. The Internet and the Communications Decency Act 
The World Wide Web was developed for a society whose demand 
for information and technology allowed Internet usage to spread quickly 
into homes, offices, and classrooms via the personal computer.27  People 
                                                                                                             
younger children, we would like to house white children’’; and “Provider will provide 
room and board for $400 but prefers two white females.”  Id. at 69–70.  See also Jeffrey M. 
Sussman, Student Article, Cyberspace:  An Emerging Safe Haven for Housing Discrimination, 19 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 194, 215 (2007) (arguing that the application of the CDA to FHA 
violations has made the Internet a sanctuary for those who wish to discriminate). 
25 Infra Part II.D (discussing the Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions in depth). 
26 Infra Part II.B (providing an overview of the Internet’s development and special issues 
inherent to Internet-related cases). 
27 JAN SAMORISKI, ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE 25 (2002).  The number of Internet hosts went 
from about five million in 1995 to over seventy million in 2000.  Id. at 25 fig. 2.3.  The 
number of websites increased from less than one million to more than eighteen million 
between 1996 and 2000.  Id. at 26, fig. 2.4.  A 2004 study released by the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration reported that fifty-four percent of 
American households had Internet access in the home.  A NATION ONLINE:  ENTERING THE 
BROADBAND AGE, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol/NationOnlineBroadband04. 
pdf. (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).  According to the United States Census Bureau, more than 
one hundred and two million Americans had Internet access in their homes as of 2006, and 
an additional thirty-four million had Internet access at work.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
INTERNET ACCESS AND USAGE AND ONLINE SERVICE USAGE:  2006, http://www.census.gov/ 
compendia/statab/tables/08s1127.xls (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).  Although the terms 
“Internet” and “World Wide Web” are often interchanged, this practice is erroneous 
because the World Wide Web is simply one method of accessing information on the 
Internet.  Webopedia, The Difference Between the Internet and the World Wide Web, 
http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2002/Web_vs_Internet.asp (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2009).  The Internet’s humble beginnings can be traced back to 1961 when a 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology scientist began researching methods to connect 
computers through digital bursts of data known as packet technology.  SAMORISKI, supra at 
22.  The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) became involved with 
packet technology research in the mid-1960s in order to place the United States at the 
forefront of military scientific advancement.  Id.  See also FRED FEDLER ET. AL., REPORTING 
FOR THE MEDIA 407 (7th ed. 2001) (discussing early developments in digital technology, 
such as the first time several university computer sites were connected via the Internet).  
The modern Internet is built on Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(“TCP/IP”), a system that allows data to be broken into smaller pieces, transmitted by 
routers and servers, and reassembled at its final destination.  JANINE S. HILLER & RONNIE 
COHEN, INTERNET LAW & POLICY 6 (2002).  The Internet was created in part out of concern 
for the transmission of intelligence during a disaster, and the military found TCP/IP 
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are increasingly turning to the Internet as a source for news and 
information, which has resulted in a massive decrease in traditional print 
source circulation.28  The latest technological advances have allowed 
                                                                                                             
technology appealing because it was a “cheap, efficient, and almost indestructible system 
of network communication . . . [with the] ability to maintain communication in the event of 
disruption caused, for example, by nuclear war.”  SAMORISKI, supra, at 23.  The Domain 
Naming System (“DNS”), which was originally government controlled, categorizes TCP/IP 
addresses in a hierarchical structure of primary and secondary domain names.  HILLER & 
COHEN, supra at 6–7.  In 1998, the Clinton Administration “enter[ed] an agreement with 
[the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”)] to establish a 
process to transition current U.S. Government management of the Domain Name System to 
such an entity based on the principles of stability, competition, bottom-up coordination, 
and representation."  Johanna Ambrosio, Who Owns the Internet?, INFORMATIONWEEK 
ONLINE, (July 26, 2006), available at http://www.informationweek.com/newsletters/daily/ 
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=191201674 (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).  After a period of 
research and proposals, the Clinton Administration awarded the contract to ICANN.  Id.  
ICANN is responsible for: 
[m]anaging and coordinating the Domain Name System (DNS) to 
ensure that every address is unique and that all users of the Internet 
can find all valid addresses.  It does this by overseeing the distribution 
of unique IP addresses and domain names. It also ensures that each 
domain name maps to the correct IP address.  ICANN is also 
responsible for accrediting the domain name registrars. 
ICANN FAQ, http://www.icann.org/en/faq/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).  The World Wide 
Web is a portion of the Internet that relies on its own computer language and is distinct 
from other components of the Internet, such as email, instant messaging, and Usenet news 
groups.  See Webopedia, supra.  European Organization for Nuclear Research (“CERN”) 
scientist Tim Berners-Lee is regarded as the father of the World Wide Web, as he developed 
the programming protocols (hypertext transfer protocols or “HTTP”) that simplified online 
navigation, linking computers to allow user accessibility of textual, visual, and audio files 
from anywhere on the Internet.  SAMORISKI, supra at 24–25.  For a compilation of articles 
discussing Tim Berners–Lee’s contributions in greater detail, see the CERN website at 
http://cernsearch.web.cern.ch/cernsearch/Default.aspx?query=generic2:Public%20Tim% 
20Berners-Lee (last visited Aug. 1, 2009). 
28 Collins, supra note 24, at 1491.  See William Pack, U.S. Newspaper Circulation Continues 
to Decline, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008, at 2C (reporting that the San Antonio 
Express-News’ daily circulation had dropped by 7.7 percent since 2007, but its online 
readership had increased 4.3 percent); Lorraine Mirabella, Sun’s Daily Circulation Falls 5.9% 
Over Six Months, THE BALT. SUN, Oct. 28, 2008, at 15A (reporting that all of the nation’s top 
twenty-five newspapers have recorded an average 4.8 percent decrease in the last six 
months and that the loss is a result of competition from online news sources); Staff Report, 
Los Angeles Times to Lay Off 75 Staffers, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 28, 2008, at C2 (noting that 
the L.A. Times’ parent company laid off two hundred and fifty people in summer 2008, 
including one hundred and fifty in the newsroom); Jenifer B. McKim, Delivering the News 
Without the Paper, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 2008, at 5 (reporting that the Christian 
Science Monitor will be the first national newspaper to eliminate its print edition in favor of 
improving the quality of its web edition).  An ethics group leader from the Poynter 
Institute, a prominent resource for journalists, stated that many newspapers are “teetering 
on the brink of instability” and that she was not sure whether focusing solely on an online 
edition was “a last dying gasp or . . . the first steps of transformation.”  McKim, supra.  In 
addition to using the Internet as a resource for news, Americans are turning to the Internet 
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users to access the Internet on cellular phones, personal digital assistants, 
in vehicles, and even on airplanes.29  Although the Internet allows for the 
exchange of ideas and information with increasing speed and efficiency, 
its use poses serious questions for American lawmakers as to who 
should exercise jurisdiction over the information superhighway.30  
Jurisdiction gives a court the power to exercise legal authority over 
persons, property, and issues, and is typically based on geographic and 
political boundaries.31  The United States uses a dual system of 
government that often raises questions on whether a particular issue is 
                                                                                                             
for a variety of tasks, such as shopping, banking, stock trading, and job searching.  See, e.g., 
Macy’s Website, http://www.macys.com (allowing users to browse and purchase items 
from Macy’s department stores) (last visited Aug. 1, 2009); U.S. Bank Website, 
http://www.usbank.com (providing U.S. Bank customers with online access to their 
personal and business banking accounts) (last visited Aug. 1, 2009); E-Trade Online, 
http://www.etrade.com (allowing people to buy and sell stocks online) (last visited Aug. 
1, 2009); Monster, http://www.monster.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2009) (providing a forum 
where people may search for jobs, submit résumés, and screen potential employees online). 
29 See Tim Barker, Smart Phones Connect with More Customers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Sept. 9, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 17072747 (discussing consumer mechanisms for 
coping without cell phones and the accompanying Internet access); Geek.com Team Post, 
Internet in Your Car, http://www.geek.com/internet-in-your-car (discussing various 
devices and service providers for Internet access in a motor vehicle); Wallstreet Fighter, 
Internet Access On Airplanes Is Here, http://www.wallstreetfighter.com/2008/08/ 
internet-access-on-airplanes.html (discussing American Airlines’ decision to allow Internet 
access for its patrons) (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
30 See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text (discussing the problems faced by courts 
attempting to exercise jurisdiction over Internet cases). 
31 HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 11.  The term “jurisdiction” is a general term with 
several definitions:  “(1) [a] government’s general power to exercise authority over all 
persons and things within its territory, (2) [a] court’s power to decide a case or issue a 
decree, (3) [a] geographic area within which political or judicial authority maybe exercised; 
(4) [a] political or judicial subdivision within such an area.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 
(3d pocket ed. 2006).  A court’s jurisdiction consists of both personal and subject matter 
elements, and the exercise of jurisdiction is improper if either element is not present.  
JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 59 (5th ed. 2006).  
Bases for personal jurisdiction include physical presence, domicile, consent, and 
“minimum contacts.”  Id. at 4.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (discussing the 
traditional modes of obtaining personal jurisdiction); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (defining the “minimum contacts” test as a defendant’s minimum 
contacts with a territory “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”) (internal citation omitted).  Subject matter 
jurisdiction is “[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the 
extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra at 396.  Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning a 
federal court has subject matter jurisdiction only if its power to hear a particular type of 
case is authorized by the U.S. Constitution, federal statute, or judicial decision.  JACK H. 
FRIEDENTHAL ET. AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 245 (9th ed. 2005). 
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properly regulated by state or federal law.32  In the past, states have 
enacted laws attempting to directly regulate aspects of the Internet, 
including online pornography and alcohol distribution; however, the 
dormant commerce clause invalidated most of those statutes.33  
                                                 
32 CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & ALLAN IDES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  NATIONAL POWER AND 
FEDERALISM 268 (4th ed. 2007).  Under the preemption doctrine, state law that is 
inconsistent with the goals or text of valid federal law cannot stand.  Id.  The federal law 
may include a textual provision explicitly preempting state law.  Id.  See Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (“[T]he provisions of 
this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any 
employee benefit described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 
1003(b).”); Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3003(d) (2006) (“This chapter 
shall preempt State law to the extent such law is inconsistent with a provision of this 
chapter.”).  When it is impossible to comply with both a state and federal law, the 
conflicting provisions of the state law invalidated.  MAY & IDES, supra at 268; see Fla. Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (holding that the test of whether a 
particular state statute can co–exist with a federal statute regulating the same subject is 
“whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence 
of the field”).  Finally, a state law may be preempted when Congress intends to give the 
federal government exclusive regulatory power over a particular subject matter, such as 
interstate commerce.  MAY & IDES, supra at 269. When regulation of the Internet is at issue, 
the Commerce Clause typically answers these questions.  HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 
11.  The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Generally, the Commerce Clause allows Congress to 
regulate three main categories of commerce:  the channels of interstate commerce; the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and any activity that has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 366–67 (2005).  The Dormant or Negative Commerce Clause, a purely judicial 
interpretation, prohibits states from passing legislation regulating activity within their 
boundaries that substantially hampers interstate commerce.  HILLER & COHEN, supra note 
27, at 12; see C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383, 393–94 (1994) 
(invalidating a flow-control ordinance that set up a mandatory processing facility for solid 
waste because it discriminated against interstate commerce); Raymond Kassel v. Consol. 
Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 678–79 (invalidating an Iowa statute prohibiting 
the use of sixty-five-foot double trailers within its borders because it placed a substantial 
burden on out-of-state trucking companies).  Nevertheless, not all members of the Supreme 
Court believe in the existence of the Dormant Commerce Clause.  See Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The so-called ‘negative’ Commerce 
Clause is an unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded beyond its existing domain 
. . .”); United Haulers Ass’n. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 
1799 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The negative Commerce Clause has 
no basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice.”). 
33 HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 12, 16.  Hiller and Cohen noted that “[t]he plaintiffs 
challenging these state laws argue that the Internet, by its borderless nature, is inherently a 
form of interstate commerce, and a state’s attempt to regulate conduct on the Internet poses 
an undue, and therefore, unconstitutional burden on it.”  Id. at 12.  See generally S.E. 
Booksellers Ass’n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773 (2005) (granting pre-enforcement 
enjoinment of a state statute that would impose criminal sanctions on those who 
disseminate harmful materials to minors via the Internet because the statute violated the 
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) 
Ross: Cyberspace:  The New Frontier for Housing Discrimination--An Anal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
340 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
Nevertheless, the states’ concerns regarding the Internet did not go 
unnoticed by Congress, which has since passed legislation addressing 
some controversial Internet issues.34  Even though the Commerce Clause 
can make it difficult for states to enact new legislation directly regulating 
an Internet user’s behavior, a state may still enforce its laws already on 
record against an Internet-based defendant.35 
The Internet’s broad coverage creates controversy in the realm of 
personal jurisdiction.36  States that have not amended their long-arm 
                                                                                                             
(invalidating Michigan and New York statutes regulating alcohol distribution because they 
discriminated against interstate commerce).  Despite the states’ argument that concern for 
the ease with which minors could obtain alcohol via the Internet was a compelling state 
interest, the Court found that the states did not adequately demonstrate the need for 
discrimination such that the laws could be upheld under the Dormant Commerce Clause.  
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489, 493. 
34 For example, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 provides in 
part: 
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may 
knowingly accept, in connection with the participation of another 
person in unlawful Internet gambling—(1) credit, or the proceeds of 
credit, extended to or on behalf of such other person (including credit 
extended through the use of a credit card); (2) an electronic fund 
transfer, or funds transmitted by or through a money transmitting 
business, or the proceeds of an electronic fund transfer or money 
transmitting service, from or on behalf of such other person; (3) any 
check, draft, or similar instrument which is drawn by or on behalf of 
such other person and is drawn on or payable at or through any 
financial institution; or (4) the proceeds of any other form of financial 
transaction, as the Secretary and the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System may jointly prescribe by regulation, which involves a 
financial institution as a payor [sic] or financial intermediary on behalf 
of or for the benefit of such other person. 
31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).  See also the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) 
(2006) (immunizing interactive computer services from liability for third party user 
content).  The Twenty First Amendment provides, however, that “[t]he transportation or 
importation into any State, Territory or possession on the United States for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.  In Granholm, the Court addressed the states’ arguments under 
Section 2, holding that states have broad power to regulate some Internet activity under the 
provision, but that they must do so evenhandedly, treating in-state and out-of-state entities 
alike.  544 U.S. at 493. 
35 Supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the Commerce Clause’s invalidation 
of state laws attempting to regulate Internet behavior); infra note 36 and accompanying text 
(providing an example of how one state amended its long-arm statute to reach Internet 
defendants for purposes of personal jurisdiction). 
36 HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 16.  In response to Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, a 
case that set forth the “minimum contacts” test, many states passed long-arm statutes 
enumerating certain types of contact with the state that would give courts within the state 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.  GLANNON, supra note 31, at 24–25; see Int’l Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A) 
(2004).  The statute states: 
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statutes to include Internet contacts rely on the Supreme Court’s 
evolving standard in this relatively new area of personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence.37  Although the Internet exposes the antiquity of the 
                                                                                                             
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts 
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the 
person’s: 
(1)  Transacting any business in this state; 
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; 
(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission 
outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in 
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue 
from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; 
(5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of 
warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this 
state when he might reasonably have expected such person to use, 
consume, or be affected by the goods in this state, provided that he 
also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from 
goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; 
(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act 
outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, 
when he might reasonably have expected that some person would be 
injured thereby in this state; 
(7) Causing tortious injury to any person by a criminal act, any 
element of which takes place in this state, which he commits or in the 
commission of which he is guilty of complicity; 
(8) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in 
this state; 
(9) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located 
within this state at the time of contracting. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382.  North Carolina, for example, has addressed the 
problem by amending its long-arm statute to include Internet contacts with the state.  See 
e.g. N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-75.4 (2007).  The Local Injury, Foreign Act category of the North 
Carolina long-arm statute includes “[u]nsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail [that is] 
sent into or within this State by the defendant using a computer, computer network, or the 
computer services of an electronic mail service provider in contravention of the authority 
granted by or in violation of the policies set by the electronic mail service provider.”  Id. § 
1.75.4(4)(c).  For a complete listing of state long-arm statutes and a discussion of how each 
state treats electronic contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction, see Vedder, Price, 
Kaufman & Kammholz, P.C., Long Arm Statutes:  A Fifty-State Survey (2003) (available at 
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf) (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2009). 
37 HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 17.  See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 
(1996) (holding that a Texas defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio because 
he was party to a contract governed by Ohio law and sent several emails to the Ohio-based 
plaintiff).  In CompuServe, the Court employed the standard of “purposeful availment” 
articulated by Justice O’Connor in Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265.  In Asahi, Justice O’Connor argued that “[t]he placement of a 
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J., 
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Court’s jurisdictional doctrines, history shows that the law will 
eventually adapt accordingly, even if it is in a Johnny-come-lately 
fashion.38  Thus, a court can hear an Internet-related case on the merits 
only when the parties clear the personal and subject-matter jurisdiction 
hurdles.39  Next, this Note steps away from the jurisdictional issues 
courts may face regarding Internet-related cases and focuses on the 
CDA’s regulation of the Internet.40 
C. Development of the Communications Decency Act 
In 1995, a New York trial court rendered a decision that compelled 
Congress to amend the Telecommunications Act of 1934.41  In Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., the New York Supreme Court 
considered whether an Internet service provider could be held liable for 
                                                                                                             
plurality opinion); cf.  Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Com., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997) (holding that a California-based defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania by virtue of its doing online business with Pennsylvania residents).  In Zippo, 
the court found that the validity of personal jurisdiction “is directly proportionate to the 
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.”  Zippo, 
952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
38 HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 21.  Hiller and Cohen compare the Internet to the 
advent of the assembly line and mass production of the automobile, arguing that “[w]hile 
the world of physical transactions may be like the stagecoach, and thus many of the rules 
developed to govern it may not be applicable to the Internet, the underlying legal 
principles will be applied to the electronic environment as they were to the automobile.”  
Id. at 22. 
39 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction). 
40 See infra Part II.C (discussing the development and application of the CDA).  This 
Note does not further address jurisdictional issues related to the Internet.  Part II.B.2 
provides a cursory understanding of some of the issues a court may address before an 
action involving the Internet may be heard on the merits.  This Note’s primary focus is on 
the substance of the CDA, its controversial applications, and ways in which it may be 
improved. 
41 Kurth, supra note 16, at 821 (arguing that the CDA was to effectively overrule the 
decision in Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.).  See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (modernizing the Telecommunications Act of 1934 
to incorporate Internet transmissions).  See also Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).  Stratton Oakmont, an investment-banking 
firm, commenced a libel action against Prodigy, an Internet service provider, resulting from 
several postings on a user message board.  Id. at *1.  Stratton Oakmont’s president claimed 
the firm was defamed on a message board owned and operated by Prodigy.  Id.  “Money 
Talk,” the online bulletin board on which the allegedly defamatory statements appeared, 
was “the leading and most widely read financial computer bulletin board in the United 
States [in 1994], where members [could] post statements regarding stocks, investments, and 
other financial matters.”  Id.  Among the statements were claims that Stratton Oakmont 
was a “cult of brokers who either lie for a living or get fired” and that Stratton Oakmont’s 
President had committed criminal and fraudulent acts in the public sale of stock.  Id. 
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the content of its online message board.42  Ultimately, the Stratton 
Oakmont court found that the Internet service provider had published the 
defamatory statements and reasoned that its “conscious choice, to gain 
the benefits of editorial control, had opened it up to a greater liability 
than . . . other computer networks that make no such choice.”43  Some 
commentators interpret Stratton Oakmont as imposing publisher liability 
in defamation actions on any online service that exercises any degree of 
control over the content of its user forums.44  In response to the Stratton 
Oakmont decision, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
which was designed to “promote competition and reduce regulation in 
order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of 
                                                 
42 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *3.  In order for Stratton Oakmont to prevail, it 
had to prove that Prodigy published the allegedly defamatory statements.  Id.  Generally, a 
defendant who repeats or republishes libel is subject to the same liability as if he had 
published the original.  Id. (citing Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (1980)).  
Distributors of communication, however, are considered passive conduits of defamatory 
information and will not be held liable for its content unless they know or have reason to 
know of the defamation.  Id.  Libel is “the publication of defamatory matter by written or 
printed words, by its embodiment in physical form, or by any other form of 
communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or 
printed words.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977).  “Publication” is a legal 
term of art meaning that the harmful content is communicated by the defendant to a third 
party.  EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 442 (4th ed. 2005).  Four years after 
Stratton Oakmont was decided, the company’s chairman and president both pleaded guilty 
to ten counts of money laundering and securities fraud.  Edward Wyatt, Stratton Oakmont 
Executives Admit Stock Manipulation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E6DC123FF937A1575AC0A96F958
260 (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).  The two men had participated in a seven-year scheme 
manipulating the stocks of thirty-four companies and defrauding investors of millions of 
dollars.  Id. 
43 1995 WL 323710, at *5.  The New York Supreme Court found that Prodigy had held 
itself out as controlling the content of its message boards by utilizing an automated filtering 
system and by implementing guidelines for users and Board Leaders to follow.  Id. at *4.  
The court noted that Prodigy’s system “may have a chilling effect on freedom of 
communication in Cyberspace, and it appears that this chilling effect is exactly what 
Prodigy wants, but for the legal liability that attaches to such censorship.”  Id. at *5. 
44 See generally Douglas B. Luftman, Note, Defamation Liability for On-line Services:  The 
Sky is Not Falling, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (1997) (describing the post-Stratton 
Oakmont sentiment as a “‘the sky is falling’ reaction” that would have amused Chicken 
Little).  Luftman argues that if online services listen to “the sky is falling” advice and 
relinquish editorial control of their user forums, it will result in a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
stagnation from Internet users’ dissatisfaction with chaotic interactive environments.  Id.  
Also, Representative Cox stated that the New York court’s ruling had sent a message to 
interactive computer services that they would be held liable for defamatory postings if they 
exercised control over the content posted by third party users.  See 141 CONG. REC. H8471 
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte). 
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new telecommunications technologies.”45  The CDA is a section within 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that supports development of the 
Internet, encourages a free market for the Internet, and promotes the 
control of offensive content by interactive computer services.46  
Prior to the enactment of the CDA, Congress considered two similar 
communications bills—the Exon-Coats bill in the Senate and the Cox-
Wyden bill in the House of Representatives.47  The Exon-Coats bill won 
                                                 
45 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).  In an 
attempt to modernize the outdated Telecommunications Act of 1934, the updated version: 
[F]undamentally restructures local telephone markets, ending the 
monopolies that states historically granted to local exchange carriers 
and subjecting incumbent local exchange carriers to a host of duties 
intended to facilitate market entry, including the obligation to share 
their networks with competitors . . . .  
  . . . .  
Specifically, telecommunications carriers have the duty to interconnect 
directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other 
telecommunications carriers; in addition, such carriers are not to install 
network features, functions, or capabilities that do not comply with 
guidelines and standards established in various sections of the Act 
regarding access by persons with disabilities and coordination for 
interconnectivity. 
74 AM. JUR. 2d Telecommunications § 16, 309-10 (2001). 
46 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).  Congress listed several policy reasons within the statute 
for the inclusion of the CDA: 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media; (2) to 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the development of 
technologies which maximize user control over what information is 
received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and 
other interactive computer services; (4) to remove disincentives for the 
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that 
empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material; and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement 
of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, 
stalking, and harassment by means of computer. 
Id. § 230(b)(1)–(5).  The CDA originally regulated the dissemination of pornography on the 
Internet and protected online services that blocked offensive content.  See infra note 55 
(discussing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the case that invalidated the CDA’s 
provisions related to pornography dissemination). 
47 Kurth, supra note 16, at 821; infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Exon-Coats and Cox-Wyden bills).  Senator James Exon became a champion for children 
against the dangers of Internet predators and pornography in 1994 after watching a 
Dateline special about Internet pedophiles.  Kurth, supra note 16, at 821.  In addition to the 
Dateline special, the infamous Rimm Study of Internet pornography suggested that eighty-
three percent of the images available on the Internet were pornographic.  Robert Cannon, 
The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act:  Regulating Barbarians 
on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 53 (2006).  The phenomenon piqued 
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the Senate’s approval in June 1995 despite strong opposition from those 
who wished to abstain from Internet regulation and those who believed 
the proposed amendment was riddled with escape hatches for 
pornographers.48 
                                                                                                             
national interest when Time magazine ran a cover story about the study.  Id. at 54.  Not 
everyone believed, however, that the world’s largest red light district was only a click 
away, as several professors criticized the study claiming that the methodology and 
procedure were flawed and that the study was conducted in an ethically questionable 
manner.  Id. at 56.  See also Lisa Sigel & Geoffrey Sauer, Critique of Rimm Article on Online 
Pornography, http://sloan.ucr.edu/cyberporn/sigel.sauer.critique.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 
2009) (criticizing many of the research techniques employed in the Rimm study).  On July 
26, 1994, Senator Exon proposed a communications decency amendment intended to “help 
assure that the information superhighway does not turn into a red light district . . . [and to] 
protect children from being exposed to obscene, lewd, or indecent messages.”  140 CONG. 
REC. 18046 (1994) (statement of Sen. Exon).  Senator Exon explained that the amendment 
was also designed to modernize the Telecommunications Act of 1934, noting that the Act’s 
provisions “were couched in the context of telephone technology [and] . . . must be 
updated for the digital world of the future.”  Id.  In addition to shielding children from 
pornographic images, the amendment was to prevent online stalking and other misuse of 
the Internet.  Id.  The Exon-Coats bill would extend criminal penalties for indecency and 
obscenity-based violations, which had previously applied only to telephone services, and 
would place regulatory control in the hands of the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”).  Chang, supra note 20, at 989.  Specifically, the amendment would replace 
references to “telephone” with the phrase “telecommunications device” and increase 
penalties for violations to one hundred thousand dollars and two years imprisonment.  140 
CONG. REC. 18045 (1994) (statement of Sen. Exon) (containing the revisions proposed by 
Senator Exon). 
48 Cannon, supra note 47, at 66.  On April 7, 1995, Senator Leahy proposed an alternative 
bill that called for a study to be conducted by the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Commerce.  See S. 714, 104th Cong. (1995).  Upon introduction, Senator 
Leahy noted: 
Many of us are, thus, justifiably concerned about the accessibility of 
obscene and indecent materials on-line and the ability of parents to 
monitor and control the materials to which their children are exposed.  
But government regulation of the content of all computer and 
telephone communications, even private communications, in violation 
of the First Amendment is not the answer—it is merely a knee–jerk 
response. 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., LEAHY STATEMENT ON INTRODUCTION OF S.714, 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/cda/950407s714_leahy_statement.html (last visited Aug. 24, 
2009).  On June 7, 1995, Senator Grassley introduced a bill that censored the Internet and 
provided no defenses for violators.  See S. 892, 104th Cong. (1995).  The Grassley bill would 
create two distinct criminal offenses.  141 CONG. REC. S7922 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Grassley).  The first would have made it a crime to “knowingly or 
recklessly transmit indecent pornography to minors.”  Id.  The second would have been 
applicable to online services that allowed users to post to bulletin boards and would have 
made it unlawful to “willfully permit an [adult] to transmit indecent pornography to a 
minor.”  Id.  When Senator Grassley introduced the bill, he noted that “[w]ith the rise of 
global, international computer networks . . . Congress has a more extensive role to play in 
protecting children.  [This] initiative responds to this changed environment by ‘filling in 
the gaps’ created by new technology.”  Id. 
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Protecting children from accessing sexually explicit material on the 
Internet was one of the motivating factors behind the Cox-Wyden bill in 
the House, but the bill was also proposed in opposition to the regulatory 
scheme created by the Senate’s Exon-Coats bill and the Stratton Oakmont 
decision.49  The Cox-Wyden bill would have overruled Stratton Oakmont 
and protected “interactive computer services” against liability resulting 
from third-party Internet content.50  Despite the rejection, the Cox-
Wyden bill was included as Section 230 of the CDA; however, one 
                                                 
49 Chang, supra note 20, at 988–91 (listing the motivations behind the Cox-Wyden bill).  
Specifically, members of the House were aware of the public’s negative response to the 
recently passed Senate bill and believed it might place unconstitutional restrictions on 
speech.  Id. at 989–90.  Representative Cox argued that “[t]he Cox-Wyden amendment 
removes the liability of providers such as Prodigy who currently make a good faith effort 
to edit the smut.”  141 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).  
See Michelle V. Rafter, On-line Protestors Rally Against Decency Act, ST. LOUIS POST–
DISPATCH, Dec. 20, 1995, at 7C, available at 1995 WLNR 737201.  “Close to 9,000 people had 
notified the lobby group that they had contacted their congressional representatives to 
protest Internet censorship, and new email messages were rolling in at the rate of a 
thousand every 10 minutes.”  Id.  See also supra note 43 (detailing the New York trial court’s 
approach in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 
24, 1995)). 
50 Kurth, supra note 16, at 825 (arguing that in overruling Stratton Oakmont, Congress 
intended to promote self-regulation on the Internet).  “Interactive computer service” is 
defined within the text of the CDA as  “any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, 
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such 
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”  47 U.S.C. § 
230(f)(2) (2006).  At the heart of the provision was the notion that those interactive 
computer services that made good-faith efforts to screen their content should not be liable 
if a piece of offensive information evades the filters.  Kurth, supra note 16, at 824.  The 
House bill forwent assigning regulatory control to the FCC in favor of utilizing a system 
that would encourage interactive computer services and individuals to screen potentially 
harmful content.  Chang, supra note 20, at 990 (discussing the House’s view that the 
inclusion of the FCC would be less effective and efficient than allowing self-regulation on 
the Internet).  Representative Cox stated that “[i]f we regulate the Internet at the FCC, that 
will freeze or at least slow down technology. It will threaten the future of the Internet.  That 
is why it is so important that we not have a Federal computer commission do that.”  141 
CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).  The House passed the 
Cox-Wyden bill by a majority vote of 402–04 in what appeared to be a landslide victory for 
those who expressed anti–regulatory sentiment regarding the Internet.  CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH., POLICY POST, (Aug. 4, 1995), available at http://www.cdt.org/ 
publications/pp230804.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2009).  The “Policy Post” newsletter 
claimed that the Cox-Wyden bill: 
[prohibited] the FCC from imposing content regulations on the 
Internet or other interactive media[,] [removed] disincentives for 
online service providers to exercise editorial control over their 
networks and to provide blocking and screening technologies to their 
uses[,] [and sought] to create a uniform national policy prohibiting 
content regulations in interactive media. 
Id. 
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commentator describes its inclusion as a hollow victory because it has no 
effect on the provisions in the CDA that came from the Exon-Coats bill.51  
Specifically, Section 230(c) contains a Good Samaritan provision that is 
particularly important for the purposes of this Note.52  A plain reading of 
the Good Samaritan provision suggests that all claims involving 
publisher liability resulting from third-party user postings are barred, 
but Congress failed to define the scope of immunity and the phrase 
“publisher or speaker.”53  Further arguments exist as to whether 
                                                 
51 Cannon, supra note 47, at 68.  Cannon called the Cox-Wyden Amendment “far from a 
victory,” noting that the amendment “specifically and curiously stated that ‘nothing in this 
section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 of’ Title 47, the very 
statute that [the Exon-Coats bill] sought to amend.  As a result, the House and Senate 
amendments were described as fitting together ‘like a hand in a glove.’”  Id. (quoting 141 
Cong. Rec. H8468–69 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). 
52 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).  Section 230(c)’s grant of immunity directly conflicts with 
the expansive liability contained in Section 3604(c) of the FHA.  See id.  The provision reads: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of 
offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker: 
 No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or 
not such material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means 
to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 
Id.  The statute defines “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”  Id. § 230(f)(3).  See also 
supra note 50 (defining “interactive computer service”).  See generally infra Parts III–IV 
(discussing the CDA’s conflict with the FHA and proposing a revision to the text of Section 
230(c)(1)). 
53 Chang, supra note 20, at 984 (stating that the Good Samaritan provision is unclear as to 
how “publisher” should be defined); 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  At common law, whether a person 
was a “publisher” for purposes of imposing defamation liability hinged on the “extent to 
which he participates with an author . . . of the defamatory statement in its publication.”  
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 113 (5th ed. 1984).  Actors who are more intimately 
involved in the process may be held liable “because they have the opportunity to know the 
content of the material being published.”  Id. §113.  In contrast, “one who only delivers or 
transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, 
he knows or had reason to know of its defamatory character.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 581 (1977).  The ordinary meaning of publisher is  “[o]ne who publishes or makes 
something public; one who declares, announces or proclaims publicly . . . [o]ne who puts 
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Congress intended the Good Samaritan provision to apply beyond 
defamation cases, and, if so, whether the list of exceptions is 
exhaustive.54  Generally, the courts have interpreted the Good Samaritan 
                                                                                                             
anything into circulation.”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 785–86 (2d ed. 1989); cf. Zeran v. 
Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997).  The court found that “a publisher is not 
merely one who intentionally communicates defamatory information.  Instead, the law 
treats as a publisher or speaker one who fails to take reasonable steps to remove 
defamatory statements from property under her control.”  Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1133. 
54 Section 230(e) provides several exceptions where the Good Samaritan provision does 
not apply: 
(e) Effect on other laws 
(1) No effect on criminal law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the 
enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating 
to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of 
title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute. 
(2) No effect on intellectual property law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand 
any law pertaining to intellectual property. 
(3) State law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any 
State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this 
section. No cause of action may be brought and no liability may 
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with 
this section. 
(4) No effect on communications privacy law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
or any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State 
law. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(e).  See Chang, supra note 20, at 991.  “[T]he House also recognized that the 
application of traditional common law defamation principles in the context of the Internet 
might serve as an obstacle to harnessing the cooperation of the private sector.”  Id.  But see 
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, No. CV 03-
09386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004), rev’d, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 
2008).  The court relied on the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, which means “[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a 
general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence 
of a contrary legislative intent.”  Id. at *3.  According to Sutherland: 
As the maxim is applied to statutory interpretation, where a form of 
conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons 
and things to which it refers are designated, there is an inference that 
all omissions should be understood as exclusions.  The maxim does not 
apply to every statutory listing or grouping. It has force only when the 
items expressed are members of an associated group or series, 
justifying the inference that the items not mentioned were excluded by 
deliberate choice. 
2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23, 398–99, 401, 404-6, 412 (7th ed. 2007) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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provision as providing near-absolute immunity for third-party FHA 
violations to interactive computer services.55 
Section 230’s first major challenge came in Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc.56  In this seminal case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that Section 230 provided immunity to an interactive computer service 
                                                 
55 Infra notes 56–71 and accompanying text (discussing several cases where courts have 
found interactive computer services to be immune from publisher liability through the 
CDA for third-party tort and statutory infractions).  Section 223, a series of provisions 
originally proposed in the Exon-Coats bill, was the first portion of the CDA to be 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997).  In Reno, immediately after President Bill Clinton signed the CDA, twenty plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of CDA provisions designed to protect children from 
“indecent communications.”  Id. at 861.  In a facial challenge to the new statute’s 
constitutionality, the Court unanimously held that two provisions of Section 223 were 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, finding that: 
[G]iven the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it 
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be 
entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further 
reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad.  The CDA’s 
burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided 
by a more carefully drafted statute. 
Id. at 874.  Congress addressed the legislation’s flaws in its introduction of the Child Online 
Protection Act, but a similar constitutional challenge was brought within less than twenty-
four hours of President Bill Clinton’s signing of the bill.  Sheryl Rakestraw, Current Event, 
10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 521, 521 n.3 (2002). 
56 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997), a’ffd, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).  Shortly after the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, an anonymous America Online (AOL) member defamed 
Zeran on an AOL message board.  Id. at 1127.  The poster listed Ken Zeran’s name and 
telephone number on a phony advertisement for shirts that carried messages such as “Visit 
Oklahoma . . . It's a BLAST!!!,” “Putting the kids to bed . . . Oklahoma 1995,” and “McVeigh 
for President 1996.”  Id.  Zeran received a “flood of abusive telephone calls,” estimating 
about one every two minutes.  Id. at 1128.  Similar false advertisements appeared on the 
message boards even after Zeran notified AOL, and the phone calls did not subside until 
more than three weeks later.  Id.  Zeran brought a negligence action against AOL for its 
failure to remove the allegedly defamatory postings from its message boards, but AOL 
argued that Zeran’s action was preempted by the Good Samaritan provision.  Id. at 1129.  
Zeran’s theory was derived from Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991).  Id. at 1128–29.  See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 141 (holding that information distributors 
cannot be held liable unless they knew or had reason to know that the information was 
defamatory).  The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also considered the 
three instances under which preemption is proper:  where Congress expresses an intent to 
displace state law, where Congress implies such an intent, or where state law conflicts with 
federal law.  Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1129 n.9 (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 
(1990)).  The court reasoned that Zeran had miscategorized distributor liability as distinct 
and separate from publisher liability when it was in fact “a species or type of liability for 
publishing defamatory material.”  Id. at 1133.  The court agreed with AOL, holding that 
“although the CDA does not preempt all state law causes of action concerning interactive 
computer services, it does preempt Zeran’s claim.  This is so because his ‘negligence’ cause 
of action conflicts with both the express language and the purposes of the CDA.”  Id. at 
1135. 
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from a state law claim that treated the interactive computer service as a 
publisher.57 
In June 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the 
meaning of “provided” for the purposes of Section 230(c)(1).58  In Batzel 
v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “provided” referred only to 
“third-party information provided for use on the Internet or another 
interactive computer service” and remanded the case to determine if the 
information at issue had been “provided” under Section 230(c)(1).59  In 
                                                 
57 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31.  The Fourth Circuit found the congressional intent “not 
difficult to discern.”  Id.  The court specifically noted that “[t]he imposition of tort liability 
on service providers for the communications of others represented, for Congress, simply 
another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in 
part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep 
government interference in the medium to a minimum.”  Id.  The plaintiff continued to rely 
on a theory of distributor liability, but the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial 
court reasoning that computer-based companies may be liable each time they are notified 
that a potentially defamatory statement is posted on their message boards.  Id. at 333.  The 
court reasoned that: 
Each notification would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the 
circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment 
concerning the information’s defamatory character, and an on–the–
spot editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the 
continued publication of that information.  Although this might be 
feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of 
postings on interactive computer services would create an impossible 
burden in the Internet context. 
Id. 
58 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003).  In Batzel, a handyman who 
performed housework for an attorney sent an email to the Museum Security Network 
(“MSN”) alleging that the attorney said she was a descendant of a high ranking Nazi 
official and suggesting that the artwork in the attorney’s home may have been stolen from 
Jewish people during World War II.  Id. at 1020–21.  The sole operator of MSN sent the 
message to the MSN subscribers via listserv (an automated emailing list).  Id. at 1021.  The 
listserv mailings “[were] read by hundreds of museum security officials, insurance 
investigators, and law enforcement personnel around the world, who use the information 
in the [MSN] posting to track down stolen art.”  Id. at 1022.  The attorney filed a defamation 
action against several parties, including MSN, claiming that the handyman fabricated the 
allegations because she refused to show his screenplays to her Hollywood contacts and that 
she had lost several prominent clients because of the MSN listserv mailing.  Id.  The trial 
court denied MSN’s motion to strike under California’s anti–SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits 
Against Public Participation) statute (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16) and his motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 1023. 
59 333 F.3d at 1033.  The handyman claimed that he never thought his e–mail would be 
posted on an international message board and that he never would have sent the e–mail 
had he known that it would be used in such a manner.  Id. at 1032.  The Ninth Circuit 
provided the following example to illustrate its rationale: 
So, if, for example, an individual who happens to operate a website 
receives a defamatory “snail mail” letter from an old friend, the 
website operator cannot be said to have been “provided” the 
information in his capacity as a website service.  Section 230(c)(1) 
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August 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Section 230 
provided immunity for an online match-making service when a user 
posted a false profile depicting a celebrity.60  In Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., the Ninth Circuit narrowed its interpretation of 
“information content provider” and concluded the interactive computer 
service in question did not play a pertinent part in “creating, developing, 
or ‘transforming’ the relevant information.”61  
In the same year, a U.S. District Court in Virginia expanded the 
scope of Section 230(c) to bar a claim brought under Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.62  Although the plaintiff in Noah v. AOL Time Warner, 
                                                                                                             
supplies immunity for only individuals or entities acting as 
“provider[s]” or “user[s]” of an “interactive computer service,” and 
therefore does not apply when it is not “provided” to such persons in 
their roles as providers or users. 
Id. at 1033 (internal citation omitted).  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the 
interactive computer service’s argument that the handyman’s confusion was irrelevant 
because the handyman was the author of the email.  Id.  Furthermore, on remand, the issue 
of whether the handyman was a “provider” was not resolved; North Carolina’s res judicata 
doctrine entitled the interactive computer service to summary judgment because the case 
was previously dismissed by a North Carolina trial court for failure to prosecute.  Id. 
60 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003).  Christine 
Carafano was a popular actress, staring in television shows, such as “Star Trek:  Deep 
Space Nine” and “General Hospital.”  Id. at 1121.  She began receiving threatening and 
sexually explicit phone calls in response to a Matchmaker.com (owned and operated by 
Metrosplash) personal profile designed by an unknown person in Berlin, Germany.  Id.  
Carafano filed a suit against Metrosplash alleging defamation, negligence, invasion of 
privacy, and misappropriation of the right of publicity.  Id. at 1122. 
61 Id. at 1125.  Carafano argued that Metrosplash should be considered an information 
content provider because it asked a series of questions and provided a drop down menu 
for “pre-prepared responses,” but the court found that even if Metrosplash could be 
considered an information content provider, Section 230(c) would still bar the claim “unless 
Matchmaker created or developed the particular information at issue.”  Id.  The court 
reasoned that Carafano’s contact information was “transmitted unaltered to profile 
viewers” and that the sexually provocative information in the essay section did not bare 
“more than a tenuous relationship to the actual questions asked.”  Id.  See also supra note 52 
(providing the CDA’s definition of “interactive content provider”); supra note 50 (providing 
the CDA’s definition of “interactive computer service”). 
62 Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (E.D. Va. 2003).  One 
provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination and segregation in places 
of public accommodation.  42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).  The statute states in part: 
(a) Equal access. All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in 
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of 
race, color, religion, or national origin. 
(b) Establishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their 
activities by State action as places of public accommodation; lodgings; 
facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the 
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Inc. argued that the statute treated the interactive computer service as 
“the owner of a place of public accommodation,” the court found that 
the plaintiff was attempting to treat the interactive computer service as a 
publisher in violation of Section 230(c).63 
Similarly, in 2006, a U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania broadened 
the Good Samaritan provision’s grant of immunity to include protection 
                                                                                                             
premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment; other 
covered establishments. 
Id. § 2000a(a)–(b).  Noah, a Muslim, participated in faith-based chat rooms and on several 
occasions was barraged with vulgar, religiously discriminatory remarks written by other 
AOL members.  Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 535.  At the time of the action, AOL had thirty 
million subscribers and provided a variety of online services, including real time chat 
rooms where subscribers could chat via instant text messages.  Id. at 534.  For example, 
Noah alleged that “[o]n July 18, 1999 ‘SARGON I’ wrote ‘Qura’n lies about everything—a 
Satan made verses of darkness and destruction!’, ‘Mohammed was no shit, only a killer, 
thief, a liar and a adulterer!’, and ‘BYE STUPID MUSLIMS . . . ALL GO TO HELL.’”  Id. at 
535.  Even though Noah reported every incident to AOL, he claimed that AOL did nothing 
to eliminate the harassment in the Muslim chat rooms.  Id.  Noah brought a class action 
lawsuits against AOL under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulting from AOL’s failure to 
enforce the community guidelines within its member agreement.  Id.  The member 
agreement was a “legal document that details [a member’s] rights and obligations as an 
AOL member.”  Id.  The pertinent community guidelines provided: 
You will be considered in violation of the Terms of Service if you (or 
others using your account) do any of the following:  . . . [h]arass, 
threaten, embarrass, or do anything else to another member that is 
unwanted.  This means:  . . . don’t attack their race, heritage, etc. . . .  
Transmit or facilitate distribution of content that is harmful, abusive, 
racially or ethnically offensive, vulgar, sexually explicit, or in a 
reasonable person’s view, objectionable . . . .  Disrupt the flow of chat 
in chat rooms with vulgar language, abusiveness . . . . 
Id. at 536.  The member agreement stated that AOL could take action, including 
termination of accounts, against those who violated the terms of service.  Id. 
63 261 F. Supp. 2d at 538.  The district court reasoned that “[a]n examination of the injury 
claimed by plaintiff and the remedy he seeks clearly indicates that his Title II claim seeks to 
‘place’ AOL ‘in a publisher’s role.’”  Id.  Noah also contended that Section 230(c) did not 
apply to actions brought under federal civil rights statutes, but the court found that Section 
230(c)’s “expansive language grants a broad immunity limited only by specific statutory 
exclusions, none of which is applicable here.”  Id. at 539.  The court added: 
Nor can it be plausibly argued that § 230 is limited to immunity from 
state law claims for negligence or defamation.  Such a limitation is 
flatly contradicted by § 230’s exclusion of some specific federal claims.  
Those exclusions would be superfluous were § 230 immunity 
applicable only to certain state claims.  Moreover, the exclusion of 
federal criminal claims, but not federal civil rights claims, clearly 
indicates, under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that 
Congress did not intend to place federal civil rights claims outside the 
scope of § 230 immunity. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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from invasion of privacy and negligence claims.64  The Parker court 
found that Section 230 barred the plaintiff’s claims because the 
interactive computer service was not an information content provider as 
defined by the CDA.65  Nevertheless, nearly all courts that have 
addressed the application of the Good Samaritan provision have 
followed Zeran’s holding that the CDA provides immunity to interactive 
computer services from claims that treat the computer service as a 
publisher of third-party information.66  
                                                 
64 Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2006).  Roy Parker was an 
author who claimed that Google should be held liable for defamation and invasion of 
privacy because it archived false statements about him posted by Google group users, 
provided a search function that returned a list of websites containing his name, and 
continued to cache such websites after being notified that they were defamatory.  Id.  
Google operates a popular website that allows users to search the World Wide Web for 
websites, images, and documents.  Id. at 496; see Google, http://www.google.com (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2009).  In its intricate search process, Google makes a copy of each website 
and stores it in a storage tool called a cache and provides a link to the cache when listing 
search results for its users.  Parker, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 496.  Google also operates a multitude 
of user bulletin boards.  See Google Groups, http://groups.google.com (last visited Oct. 24, 
2009).  Specifically, Parker claimed that “the act of Google users putting in a search query 
of his name [led] Google to produce a list of websites in which his name [appeared], thus 
creating what he [called] ‘an unauthorized biography . . . that [was] an invasion of his right 
to privacy.’” Parker, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (internal citation omitted). 
65  422 F. Supp. 2d at 500.  The court refrained from examining the elements of Parker’s 
claim and noted that “each claim revolves around the tortious acts of a third party for 
which Parker holds Google accountable by virtue of its archived USENET system, its 
website search tool, and its caching system.”  Id.  Relying on Carafano, the court examined 
the intent behind Section § 230, concluding that “Congress granted most Internet services 
immunity from liability for publishing false or defamatory material so long as the 
information was provided by another party.  Id.  As a result, Internet publishers are treated 
differently from corresponding publishers in print, television and radio.”  Id. at 501 
(citation omitted).  The court reasoned that Google was not an information content 
provider because “[i]n each instance raised by Plaintiff's tort claims, Google either 
archived, cached, or simply provided access to content that was created by a third party.”  
Id. 
66 See Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 470–71 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding tort claims 
subject to AOL’s immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that Section 230 promoted 
freedom of speech in the “‘new and burgeoning Internet medium’ by eliminating the 
‘threat [of] tort-based lawsuits against interactive services for injury caused by ‘the 
communications of others.’”) (citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 
1997)); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) 
(holding the CDA prevents causes of action that hold interactive service providers liable for 
information generated by third parties); PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 
1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001) (reasoning that Congress enacted Section 230 to protect 
information distributors and publishers from liability for third party defamation); Doe v. 
Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 2001) (stating that the Zeran court’s analysis of 
the congressional purpose behind Section 230 was proper). 
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In contrast, a few courts have rejected the rationale used in Zeran.67  
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals questioned Zeran’s 
validity after a trial court held the Good Samaritan provision barred a 
plaintiff’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act claim.68  The Seventh 
                                                 
67 See MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL 
833595, *7–*8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004).  MCW filed a complaint against Badbusinessbureau 
for trademark infringement and violations of the Lanham Act.  Id. at *1.  
Badbusinessbureau sought a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, citing Section 230(c) of the CDA for 
support.  Id. at *7.  The Texas court held that “Section 230(c) immunity is not so broad as to 
extend to an interactive computer service that goes beyond the traditional publisher’s role 
and takes an active role in creating or developing the content at issue.”  Id. at *8.  See also 
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2003) (questioning the rationale in Zeran 
because the application of the Good Samaritan provision is inconsistent with its title); cf. 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an 
interactive service provider receives full immunity under Section 230(c) so long as a third 
party provides the content). 
68 GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659–70 (suggesting that the text of Section 230 is illogical when 
read in conjunction with its title).  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act states in 
part that: 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any 
person who intentionally— 
(a) sends through the mail, or sends or carries in interstate or 
foreign commerce, any electronic, mechanical, or other device, 
knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device 
renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious 
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications; 
(b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device, knowing or having reason to know that 
the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of 
the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications, and that such device or any component thereof has 
been or will be sent through the mail or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce; or 
(c) places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other 
publication or disseminates by electronic means any advertisement 
of— 
(i) any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing the 
content of the advertisement and knowing or having reason to 
know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful 
for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or 
electronic communications; or 
(ii) any other electronic, mechanical, or other device, where 
such advertisement promotes the use of such device for the 
purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or 
electronic communications, knowing the content of the 
advertisement and knowing or having reason to know that such 
advertisement will be sent through the mail or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2512(1) (2006).  In GTE Corp., a person installed secret cameras in college locker 
rooms, bathrooms, and showers, and several college athletes brought a claim against GTE 
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Circuit contested the policy implications of Section 230’s grant of 
immunity to interactive computer services regardless of whether they 
made an effort to screen offensive content.69  The Seventh Circuit noted 
that “a statute’s caption must yield to its text when the two conflict” and 
suggested readings that allowed for liability in some situations.70 
While district and circuit courts had interpreted the Good Samaritan 
provision as it related to tort-based actions, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the judiciary would 
soon be faced with yet another collision on the information 
superhighway—a conflict between the protection provided by the CDA’s 
Good Samaritan provision and the expansive liability imposed by the 
advertising provision of the FHA.71 
                                                                                                             
when they discovered the footage on several websites hosted by GTE.  347 F.3d at 656–57.  
GTE claimed that Section 230(c) barred the students’ claim and sought a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal.  Id. at 657. 
69 GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 657 (holding that an interactive service provider was not liable 
to the college athletes for the display of voyeur photos taken and posted by a user on its 
website).  The Seventh Circuit addressed Zeran’s validity in dicta, reasoning that “if 
[Zeran’s] reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs indifferent to the content of 
information they host or transmit:  whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection 
(c)(1)) take precautions, there is no liability under either state or federal law?”  Id.  The 
court further questioned Zeran, noting that: 
As precautions are costly, not only in direct outlay but also in lost 
revenue from the filtered customers, ISPs may be expected to take the 
do–nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1). Yet § 
230(c)—which is, recall, part of the “Communications Decency Act”—
bears the title “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening 
of offensive material”, hardly an apt description if its principal effect is 
to induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of indecent and 
offensive materials via their services. Why should a law designed to 
eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive material end up 
defeating claims by the victims of tortious or criminal conduct? 
Id. 
70 Id. (citing Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947)).  The 
Seventh Circuit suggested reading Section 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause as opposed to 
interpreting it as immunity from liability: 
On this reading, an entity would remain a “provider or user”—and 
thus be eligible for the immunity under § 230(c)(2)—as long as the 
information came from someone else; but it would become a 
“publisher or speaker” and lose the benefit of § 230(c)(2) if it created 
the objectionable information. The difference between this reading and 
the district court’s is that § 230(c)(2) never requires ISPs to filter 
offensive content, and thus § 230(e)(3) would not preempt state laws 
or common-law doctrines that induce or require ISPs to protect the 
interests of third parties, such as the spied-on plaintiffs, for such laws 
would not be “inconsistent with” this understanding of § 230(c)(1). 
Id. 
71 See infra Part I.D (discussing the conflict between the FHA and the CDA). 
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D. At Odds:  When the Good Samaritan Provision and the Fair Housing Act 
Collide 
In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando v. Roommate.com, the Ninth 
Circuit was the first to address the conflict between the CDA and the 
FHA.72  In Roommate, the trial court found that the CDA did not provide 
immunity to the corporate operator of an online roommate-matching 
website, an interactive computer service, for the FHA advertising 
violations on its website and distinguished between content that was 
created solely by third parties and content facilitated by the interactive 
computer service.73  In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
72 See No. CV 03-09386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, rev’d in part by 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding an interactive computer 
service liable for the defamatory content it helped create, but finding immunity for the 
defamatory advertisements created entirely by third parties). 
73 521 F.3d at 1175.  The defendant operated Roommates.com, a website designed to 
match people who were renting rooms with people who were searching for roommates.  Id. 
at 1161.  The website made a profit through advertising and premium subscriptions.  Id.  It 
was viewed about a million times each day and displayed approximately one hundred and 
fifty thousand postings.  Id.  In order to become a member of the website, potential 
Roommates.com subscribers were required to fill out questionnaires disclosing basic 
contact information as well as gender, sexual orientation, and family status and preferences 
related to those categories.  Id. at 1173.  This information then became the user’s profile, 
along with an “Additional Comments” section where users could post their own 
information as they saw fit.  Id.  The plaintiff alleged that Roommate had violated the FHA 
in three ways:  (1) requiring potential subscribers to fill out questionnaires listing 
discriminatory housing preferences, (2) posting the answers to the questionnaires on user 
profiles and using it as criteria in its search process, and (3) displaying discriminatory 
preferences in the “Additional Comments” section on the user profile.  Id. at 1164–65, 1173.  
The Ninth Circuit found that the Good Samaritan provision did not provide immunity for 
Roommate regarding its required questionnaire and the inclusion thereof in user profile 
web pages, but that the “Additional Comments” section was “precisely the kind of 
situation for which section 230 was designed to provide immunity.”  Id. at 1165, 1168, 1174.  
The Ninth Circuit held that Roommate could be held liable for violations committed as a 
result of the answers on the questionnaire.  The court noted that: 
Roommate created the questions and choice of answers, and designed 
its website registration process around them. Therefore, Roommate is 
undoubtedly the ‘information content provider’ as to the questions 
and can claim no immunity for posting them on its website, or for 
forcing subscribers to answer them as a condition of using its services. 
Id. at 1164.  See also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the party 
who displays content on a website may be liable even if the content was provided by a 
third party); cf. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that a website operator was immune under the Good Samaritan provision even 
when it provided a questionnaire with pre-populated answers); see supra notes 60–61 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Carafano decision).  In Roommate, the Ninth Circuit also 
considered the development and display of subscribers’ discriminatory questionnaire 
answers, noting that the information was meant to help users decide which housing 
opportunities were most compatible with their own preferences and to steer searchers in 
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extensively clarified its decisions in Batzel and Carafano, which appeared 
to be contradictory to its holding in Roommate that the interactive 
computer service was liable for FHA violations resulting from 
questionnaires created by the service, but not for violations contained in 
free-form entries created entirely by third parties.74 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit concluded in a similar case that the 
Good Samaritan provision immunized an online listing service riddled 
with user-generated postings that violated the advertising provision of 
the FHA.75  In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, 
Inc. v. Craigslist, the plaintiffs argued that an online listing service should 
be held accountable for FHA violations committed by those who posted 
                                                                                                             
the direction of the best matches based on their criteria.  521 F.3d at 1165.  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded, however, that Roommate crossed from mere transmitter to developer of 
the content by providing pre-populated answers to the questionnaire.  Id. at 1166.  
Therefore, the court held that “a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls 
within the exception to Section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the 
conduct.”  Id. at  1168. 
74 Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1170–72; see notes 58–63 and accompanying text (providing an 
in-depth discussion of the decisions in Batzel and Carafano).  The Ninth Circuit noted that 
part of Batzel’s holding was that an editor does not forfeit Section 230 immunity when 
making spelling, grammar, and length-based corrections so long as the editor’s changes do 
not contribute to the defamatory content of the message.  Id. at 1170.  The court further 
explained that under Batzel, an editor can become a developer of content, and therefore 
precluded from Section 230 immunity, when he publishes material that he believes was not 
intended for him to post online.  Id. at 1171.  The Ninth Circuit stressed that its holding 
coincided with Carafano’s rationale that “classif[ying] user characteristics . . . does not 
transform [it] into a ‘developer’ of the ‘underlying misinformation.’”  Id. at 1172 (citing 
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124).  In Carafano, the website provided neutral tools to help create 
romantic matches that did not violate any statue, whereas Roommates forced subscribers to 
disclose characteristics and used the disclosures to match roommates in violation of the 
FHA.  Id. 
75 Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 
666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).  Plaintiffs presented a laundry list of discriminatory postings on 
Craigslist’s Chicago’s housing classifieds sections, including postings such as “NO 
MINORITIES” or “Only Muslims” by users who clearly did not meet the “Mrs. Murphy 
exemption.”  Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc , 
641 F. Supp. 2d at 685–86 (N.D. Ill. 2006), a’ffd, Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666.  See supra note 23 
(explaining the “Mrs. Murphy exemption”).  Specifically, the civil rights committee alleged 
that Craigslist “publishes housing advertisements on its website that indicate a preference, 
limitation, or discrimination, or an intention to make a preference, limitation, or 
discrimination, on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, and familial status.”  
Craigslist, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 685.  Craigslist.com lists classifieds for more than five hundred 
and fifty cities in over fifty countries and is a self-proclaimed repository of listings for 
“[j]obs, housing, goods, services, romance, local activities, advice—just about anything, 
really.”  Craigslist FAQ, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last visited Aug. 1, 
2009).  For Craigslist’s current Chicago housing classifieds, see http://Chicago.craigslist. 
org/hhh (last visited Aug. 1, 2009). 
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their housing listings on the listing service’s website.76  At trial, the 
district court embarked on its own analysis of Section 230’s statutory 
construction, rejecting Zeran in favor of its own notion that Section 
230(c)(1) “bars those causes of action that would require treating an 
[interactive computer service] as a publisher of third party content.”77  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding and 
asserted that “the question is not whether Congress gave any thought to 
the Fair Housing Act, but whether it excluded Section 3604(c) from the 
reach of Section 230(c)(1)” and reasoned that, under Section 230(c)(1), the 
plaintiff “cannot sue the messenger just because the message reveals a 
third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”78 
                                                 
76 461 F. Supp. 2d at 685.  Specifically, the civil rights committee argued that the court 
should follow a Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulation that interpreted 
Section 3604(c) as applying to “[w]ritten notices and statements includ[ing] any 
applications, flyers, brochures, deeds, signs, banners, posters, billboards, or any documents 
used with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.”  Id. at 687 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.75 
(2007)).  Bryan Greene, HUD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Programs, 
submitted a memorandum that stated: 
Although the CDA does not state an intent to limit liability under the 
[FHA] or other civil rights states, some believe that Section 230 of the 
CDA gives Internet publishers immunity from lawsuits brought under 
federal and state civil rights statutes.  However, HUD has concluded 
that the CDA does not make Web sites immune from liability under 
the [FHA] or from liability under state and local laws that HUD has 
certified as substantially equivalent to the [FHA]. 
Id. at 692 n.9.  The court found that Greene’s opinion was non-binding because Congress 
did not grant HUD the power to interpret the CDA.  Id. at 692. 
77 Id. at 693.  The district court found the Zeran interpretation contained overbroad 
language and failed to take into account the textual differences between Sections 230(c)(1) 
and 230(c)(2).  Id. at 693–94.  See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing 
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
This explanation implies that Section 230(c)(1)’s immunity applies only 
to causes of action that seek to impose liability when an ICS acts like a 
professional publisher . . . [and] fails to include ICSs that do not edit, or 
choose what to post, but who nonetheless serve as a conduit for third-
party content. 
Craigslist, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 694.  Under its new interpretation of Section 230(c)(1), the 
district court held that Craigslist was not liable for the FHA violations by virtue of the CDA 
because Craigslist was an interactive computer service whose website information 
originated “from ‘another information content provider’ . . . [and] to hold Craigslist liable 
under Section 3604(c) would be to treat Craigslist as if it were the publisher of third party 
content, the plain language of Section 201(c)(1) forecloses CLC’s cause of action.”  Id. at 698. 
78 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671–72.  In its decision, the Seventh Circuit explained that online 
services were a hybrid between classified pages in newspapers, which were included in the 
scope of Section 3604(c), and “common carriers such as telephone services, which are 
unaffected by [the provision].”  Id. at 668.  Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found that 
Congress did not contemplate the FHA when it passed the CDA, stating that “the reason a 
legislature writes a general statute is to avoid any need to traipse through the United States 
Code and consider all potential sources of liability, one at a time.”  Id. at 671.  In analyzing 
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Some commentators believe the magnitude of the conflict between 
the CDA and the FHA is so great that the Supreme Court should take an 
active interest in the topic.79  While those who have commented on the 
CDA and the FHA do not all agree on the proper resolution, most have 
recognized that the judiciary’s current application of the CDA has 
several unintended consequences.80  Next, this Note analyzes a potential 
                                                                                                             
the statutory text of the CDA, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that Congress could have used 
narrowly restrictive language in Section 230(c)(1) instead of “information” that the court 
classified as “the stock in trade of online service providers.”  Id.  “[T]he actual statute has 
the word ‘information.’  That covers ads for housing, auctions of paintings that may have 
been stolen by Nazis, biting comments about steroids in baseball, efforts to verify the truth 
of politicians’ promises, and everything else that third parties may post on a website.”  Id.  
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the plaintiff’s argument that Craigslist “caused” the 
postings to be made, finding that “[n]othing in the service [C]raigslist offers induces 
anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination.”  Id. 
79 See Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78.  Klein & Doskow argue that certiorari 
for Roommate would likely be granted if sought.  Id. at 376.  Nevertheless, the commentators 
warn that other jurisdictions may be suspicious of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roommate 
because ninety percent of the Ninth Circuit cases heard by the Supreme Court in the 2006–
2007 term were reversed.  Id.  (internal citation omitted).  A circuit split is one factor the 
Court considers when deciding whether to grant certiorari, and the dissent in Roommate 
suggests that one may have been created.  Id. at 377–79; see Roommate, 521. F.3d at 1177 
(McKeown, J., dissenting); infra note 86 (providing the Supreme Court Rule governing 
grants of certiorari).  One author compared Roommate and Craiglist, concluding that the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach was improper and that the Seventh Circuit’s approach better 
reflected the intent of Congress in drafting Section 230(c).  J. Andrew Crossett, Note, Unfair 
Housing on the Internet:  The Effect of the Communications Decency Act on the Fair Housing Act, 
73 MO. L. REV. 195, 207–08 (2008). 
80 See Shanahan, supra note 22, at 155 (suggesting that the FHA be added to the 
exceptions in Section 230(e) of the CDA); Collins, supra note 24, at 1495 (proposing a 
revision to Section 230(c) that would create an exception for FHA violations); Robert J. 
Aalberts, The Communications Decency Act Trumps Fair Housing:  A Collision of Public Policy?, 
36 REAL. EST. L. J. v (2007) (arguing that the conflict between the CDA and the FHA should 
be resolved by Congress).  Other commentators believe the judiciary should be charged 
with harmonizing the CDA and the FHA.  See Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78 
(suggesting the Supreme Court should resolve the conflict); Kurth, supra note 16, at 834–35 
(arguing that the judiciary should read Section 230(c) to require a good faith effort by 
interactive computer services to screen offensive content before allowing immunity for 
FHA violations); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (Berger, C.J., 
dissenting) (noting that the judiciary concerns itself with following the letter of the law and 
not what seems morally appropriate).  One concern with the current application of the 
CDA is that it will nullify the effect of Section 3604(c) as more people abandon traditional 
print sources of information in favor of online sources.  See Collins, supra note 24, at 1491; 
infra Part III.B.1.  A second problem with the current application of the CDA is that it 
creates special status and an incentive for interactive computer services not to screen 
offensive content.  Crossett, supra note 79, at 209; infra Part III.B.2.  A third concern is that 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits ignored precedent that requires both statutes in conflict to 
be given effect in favor of substituting Congressional silence for intent, a judicial exercise 
that is frowned upon in many contexts.  See Chang, supra note 20, at 1002; Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (establishing the analysis courts should take when faced with a 
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circuit split, addresses the unpopular pitfalls of the CDA’s current 
application, and weighs the strengths and weaknesses of proposed 
solutions to the conflict.81 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Part III of this Note provides a detailed analysis of the conflict 
between the Good Samaritan provision of the CDA and the advertising 
provision of the FHA.82  Section A addresses whether a circuit split exists 
and opines that: (1) the Supreme Court likely would not have granted 
certiorari to Roommates or Craigslist if it had been petitioned and (2) that 
judicial action should not be used to resolve the conflict between the 
FHA and the CDA.83  Section B explores several problems with the 
current application of the CDA, including assertions that it eviscerates 
the effect of Section 3604(c) of the FHA, encourages interactive service 
providers to take no action, is inconsistent with congressional intent, and 
leaves victims of housing discrimination with no source of relief.84  
Finally, Section C analyzes the proposed solutions to the statutory 
conflict, ultimately calling for a specific revision to the Good Samaritan 
                                                                                                             
conflict between federal laws).  See also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Misinterpreting “Sounds of 
Silence”:  Why Courts Should Not Imply Congressional Preclusion of § 1983 Claims, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 796 (2008) (arguing that Congress’s inclusion of administrative or 
judicial remedies in a newer statute does not warrant an automatic inference that Congress 
intended to deny relief under an older statute); Marguerite M. Sullivan, Note, Brown & 
Williamson v. FDA:  Finding Congressional Intent Through Creative Statutory Interpretation—A 
Departure from Chevron, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 299 (1999) (arguing that congressional 
inaction does not equate with congressional policy in determining whether the Food and 
Drug Administration may regulate tobacco products); David S. Bogen, Mr. Justice Miller’s 
Clause:  The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1051, 
1068 (2008) (arguing that it is unclear whether a state’s boycott of foreign goods is 
consistent with federal law and asserting that “[c]ongressional silence indicates nothing”); 
infra Part III.B.3 (arguing that congressional silence should not be construed as intent to 
apply CDA immunity to interactive computer services in the context of FHA violations).  A 
final issue is that immunizing interactive computer services from FHA violations may 
leave potential plaintiffs without relief because identifying anonymous defendants can be 
an arduous and costly task.  Kurth, supra note 16, at 828; infra Part III.B.4.  See also Dendrite 
Int’l., Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. 2001) (providing a rigorous 
standard for determining when an anonymous defendant’s identity may be disclosed). 
81 Infra Part III (analyzing the conflict between the FHA and the CDA). 
82 Infra Part III (analyzing the conflict between the FHA and the CDA). 
83 Infra Part III.A (arguing that no viable circuit split exists between the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits). 
84 Infra Part III.B (discussing the negative effects of the CDA’s current application on 
victims of FHA violations, on the goals of the FHA, and on public policy). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/9
2009] The New Frontier for Housing Discrimination 361 
provision of the CDA that better reflects congressional intent by limiting 
the provision’s application.85 
A.  A Supreme Court Decision Would Not Resolve the Conflict 
In determining whether to grant certiorari, the Supreme Court 
considers several factors, including whether “a United States court of 
appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another 
United States court of appeals on the same important matter.”86  Some 
commentators question whether Zeran, Roommate, and Craigslist can co-
exist and conclude that the Supreme Court would likely have granted 
certiorari in Roommate and Craigslist if it had been sought.87 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Roommate can be 
reconciled with Zeran and its progeny because Roommate is the only case 
                                                 
85 Infra Part III.C (weighing the proposed solutions to the conflict between the FHA and 
the CDA and calling for a textual revision to the Good Samaritan provision). 
86 Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78 (internal citation omitted).  The Supreme 
Court Rule rule governing considerations for review on certiorari provides: 
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for 
compelling reasons.  The following, although neither controlling nor 
fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the 
reasons the Court considers: 
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in 
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on 
the same important matter; has decided an important federal question 
in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call 
for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power; 
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal 
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court 
of last resort or of a United States court of appeals; 
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an 
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, 
settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a 
way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. 
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted 
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a 
properly stated rule of law. 
SUP. CT. R. 10. 
87 Crossett, supra note 79, at 207–08 (arguing the existence of a circuit split by contrasting 
the rationales employed by the Seventh and Ninth circuits in Craigslist and Roommate, 
ultimately finding fault with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the CDA); Klein & 
Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78 (expanding on the dissent’s view in Roommate that “five 
Circuits (and many district courts) had interpreted Section 230 as imposing a flat ban on 
the imposition of liability on the basis of information provided by third parties” and 
speculating that certiorari would likely be granted if sought). 
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considering the conflict between the FHA and the CDA.88  The Craigslist 
and Roommate decisions are not inconsistent because key factual 
differences between the cases led the Ninth Circuit to deny immunity for 
some of the FHA violations at issue in Roommate.89  While the Ninth 
Circuit, in Roommate, found an interactive computer service liable for the 
display of discriminatory preferences resulting from the content of its 
questionnaires, the court also found the CDA provided the interactive 
computer service immunity with regard to free-form entries provided 
entirely by third parties, which was a nearly identical scenario resulting 
in the same legal outcome as Craigslist.90 
Despite the lack of conflict between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, 
some commentators argue that Roommate presented the Supreme Court 
with the ideal opportunity to address the conflict between the CDA and 
civil rights legislation.91  Assume, arguendo, the Supreme Court had been 
given the opportunity and granted certiorari to Roommates or Craigslist.92  
                                                 
88 Roommate, 521 F.2d at 1172, n.33.  Judge Kozinski, writing for the Roommate majority, 
stated: 
The dissent coyly suggests that our opinion “sets us apart from” other 
circuits . . . carefully avoiding the phrase “intercircuit conflict.” And 
with good reason:  No other circuit has considered a case like ours and 
none has a case that even arguably conflicts with our holding today.  
No case cited by the dissent involves active participation by the 
defendant in the creation or development of the allegedly unlawful 
content; in each, the interactive computer service provider passively 
relayed content generated by third parties, just as in Stratton Oakmont, 
and did not design its system around the dissemination of unlawful 
content. 
Id. (internal citation omitted).  According to Klein & Doskow, “[t]he strong public policy 
which had been applied uniformly from Zeran forward was subordinated to a policy 
overlooked by the drafters of § 230.”  Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 377–78. 
89 Compare supra note 73 (discussing the facts in Roommate), with supra note 75 
(recounting Craigslist’s facts).  Klein and Doskow acknowledge the key difference between 
Roommate and Craigslist that “one service has, and the other lacks, the offending drop-down 
menus.”  Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 377.  Klein and Doskow focused, however, on 
the larger issue of the interpretation of Section 230 and the competing policy interests of the 
CDA and FHA, claiming that “[i]n piercing the immunity, the policy against advertising 
expressing discriminatory preferences was elevated above the immunity policy expressed 
in § 230.”  Id. 
90 Supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text and notes 75–78 and accompanying text 
(discussing the reasoning of Roommate and Craigslist). 
91 Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 378 (arguing in part that the CDA’s current state of 
affairs may be reason enough for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari).  According to 
Klein and Doskow, the possible circuit divide may cause those who have been harmed by 
housing discrimination online to shop their way into the Ninth Circuit, whereas interactive 
computer services want a forum that gives a broad reading to Section 230.  Id.  “The 
consistent holdings prior to [Roommate], and the strength of the immunity policy suggest 
the Supreme Court may take interest in this matter.”  Id. 
92 Supra note 86 (providing the criteria for granting certiorari). 
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The Court may have determined which circuit engaged in the proper 
analytical process, derived some combination of the two rationales, or 
created an entirely new method of analysis to resolve the issue.93  
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court may ever weigh in on the 
interaction between the FHA and the CDA, the conflict will likely 
continue to plague courtrooms with a tug-of-war between text and 
policy until Congress takes action, because the heart of the problem lies 
within the language of the CDA.94 
                                                 
93 For a discussion of the Roommate and Craigslist analysis, see supra notes 73–74 and 
accompanying text and notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
94 Crossett, supra note 79, at 211 (arguing that it is ultimately Congress’s responsibility to 
reconcile the CDA and the FHA).  Crossett notes: 
the enforcement of the spirit of the law would come at the expense of 
the letter of the law, which is an unacceptable result.  This 
demonstrates that the courts are not the appropriate mechanism of 
change to interpret the two competing statutes.  The language of 230(c) 
is clear in the result that it demands, but it is a distasteful result and is 
inconsistent with the letter of section 3604(c) and with how the FHA 
has been interpreted by courts. 
Id. at 211.  See also Aalberts, supra note 80, at v (noting that Congress is charged with 
resolving statutory conflict).  “Yet, unless Congress amends the CDA to create another 
expressed exception . . . supporters of the FHA . . . will have to rely on the good graces of 
[interactive computer services] . . . to assume a moral duty to eliminate or at least temper 
the tone of the discriminatory ads.”  Id.  While it is arguable that courts have on occasion 
shaped public policy at the expense of the letter of the law, Chief Justice Berger 
summarized the role of the judiciary with a quote from Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons: 
The law, Roper, the law. I know what’s legal, not what’s right. And I’ll 
stick to what’s legal. . . . .  I’m not God.  The currents and eddies of 
right and wrong, which you find such plain–sailing, I can’t navigate, 
I’m no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I’m a 
forester . . . .  What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to 
get after the Devil? . . .   And when the last law was down, and the 
Devil turned round on you[—]where would you hide, Roper, the laws 
all being flat? . . .  This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to 
coast[—]Man’s laws, not God’s[—]and if you cut them down . . . d’you 
really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow 
then? . . .  Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s 
sake. 
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (Berger, C.J., dissenting) (internal 
citation omitted).  But see Kurth, supra note 16, at 834 (arguing that the courts should read 
Section 230 as requiring as a prerequisite a good-faith effort to screen offensive content on 
the part of interactive computer services before receiving immunity). 
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B.  Why the CDA Should Not Apply to FHA Advertising Violations 
1.  Evisceration of Section 3604(c) 
Section 3604(c) was designed to reform the housing industry and 
eliminate the special dangers associated with housing discrimination.95  
Some argue that society has changed its discriminatory practices in 
recent years, but the numerous FHA violations following the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster in 2005 show that America has not progressed in 
eliminating housing bias nearly as far as some would believe.96  While 
Section 3604(c) has been particularly strong in preventing discriminatory 
print advertisements by imposing publisher liability, the provision has 
been unsuccessful in its application to interactive service providers, and 
there are no signs of recovery without congressional intervention.97  
Moreover, newspaper circulation has seen a steady decline as more 
readers and advertisers are taking advantage of the Internet’s popularity 
and real-time capabilities.98  Notwithstanding the purposes behind 
Section 3604(c), discriminatory housing advertisements will continue 
moving into the mainstream, as the Internet has been deemed a “safe 
haven” for FHA advertising violations.99  Rampant discrimination in 
                                                 
95 Crossett, supra note 79, at 210 (discussing the purpose of Section 3604(c)); supra note 19 
(providing the text of Section 3604(c)); supra note 20 and accompanying text (highlighting 
the dangers posed by housing discriminations). 
96 Collins, supra note 24, at 1491 (noting that HUD received complaints of housing 
discrimination on numerous housing websites designed especially for Hurricane Katrina 
victims).  In a 2006 hearing before Congress, a HUD administrator said that she feared the 
discriminatory advertisements were causing psychological harm and that HUD was 
rigorously investigating the allegations.  Id. at 1492.  During the hearing, a representative 
from Massachusetts addressed the reality that Congress may have inadvertently designed 
the CDA to provide for the types of violations at issue and requested HUD’s assistance in 
drafting corrective legislation if necessary.  Id.  See also supra note 24 and accompanying text 
(providing examples of the discrimination faced by Hurricane Katrina victims). 
97 See supra note 24 (listing cases in which Section 3604(c) liability was imposed on media 
including newspapers, listing services, and advertising brochures); supra Part II.D 
(providing an in-depth discussion of the holdings in Roommate and Craigslist).  Some 
authors have argued that the conflict between the CDA and FHA should be resolved by a 
revision to the CDA.  See Shanahan, supra note 22, at 155; Collins, supra note 24, at 1495; 
Crossett; supra note 79, at 211.  But see Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78 (suggesting 
that the Supreme Court may resolve the conflict between the CDA and the FHA); Kurth, 
supra note 16, at 834–35 (arguing that the judiciary could reconcile the conflict by 
“construing the CDA to require a good faith effort on the part of [interactive computer 
services] to implement screening and filtering mechanisms”). 
98 Collins, supra note 24, at 1490–91; supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the 
circulation decreases that newspapers across America are experiencing because of 
competition from online news sources). 
99 Sussman, supra note 24, at 215 (arguing that application of the CDA to Section 3604(c) 
claims requires immunity for interactive computer services and creates a “safe haven” for 
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housing sales and advertising during the 1960s originally drove 
Congress to pass Section 3604(c).100  The CDA, however, has turned the 
Internet, a mainstream medium, into a hotbed for housing 
discrimination by allowing interactive computer services to circumvent 
Section 3604(c), thereby bringing the state of the law full circle and 
eviscerating the FHA advertising provision.101  
2. Special Status for Internet Companies and the Do-Nothing Mentality 
Another criticism of allowing the CDA to provide immunity for an 
interactive computer service when its users have committed FHA 
violations is that Internet-based companies can escape liability in 
situations where traditional companies are held accountable.102  
Although some interactive computer services receive a voluminous 
number of user posts each day and have a minimal number of 
employees, those services should not be held to a different standard 
from similar traditional companies who maintain a staff sufficient to 
ensure compliance with the FHA and other applicable laws.103  Even if an 
                                                                                                             
discrimination on the Internet); supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the 
special dangers sought to be avoided by Section 3604(c)). 
100 See generally Part II.A (discussing the development of the FHA). 
101 Supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the FHA); supra note 
24 and accompanying text (illustrating the types of discrimination faced by the victims of 
Hurricane Katrina who were displaced from their homes); supra Part II.D (discussing the 
decisions in Roommate and Craigslist). 
102 Crossett, supra note 79, at 209.  “[E]nforcing the CDA against FHA claims creates an 
anomalous result, because immunizing websites results in newspapers being held liable for 
identical advertisements posted online, even if on that same newspaper’s website.”  Id.  See 
supra note 24 (providing a discussion of cases where the court extended liability to 
newspapers, listing services, and advertising brochures for publishing discriminatory 
housing advertisements in violation of the FHA).  The Fourth Circuit allowed the most 
extensive liability for intermediaries, finding that the FHA advertising provision “was 
intended to apply to newspapers as well as “any other publishing medium.”  United States 
v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972).  In Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit addressed an 
amicus brief submitted in support of the plaintiff that illustrated the judiciary’s willingness 
to apply the FHA to various media.  519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008).  Nevertheless, the 
Seventh Circuit was not persuaded by the brief, finding that “[o]nline services are in some 
respects like the classified pages of newspapers, but in others they operate like common 
carriers such as telephone services, which are unaffected by § 3604(c) because they neither 
make nor publish any discriminatory advertisement, text message, or conversation that 
may pass over their networks.”  Id. 
103 Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 343 (arguing that online services should be 
subjected to the same expenses as traditional companies).  Klein and Doskow explained: 
 There is no reason to exempt Internet roommate-matching 
services from having to bear the same costs that are borne by 
newspapers and other publishers who decide to enter the real estate 
advertising market, who must then police the contents of their real 
estate advertisements for illegal content.  The Internet permits the 
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Internet service does not have the human capital to manually edit 
postings, there are several alternative methods of monitoring third-party 
posts to ensure housing advertisements are valid under the FHA, such as 
automated screening software and user-based notification programs.104 
Furthermore, the CDA’s current application actually provides 
interactive computer services an incentive not to screen discriminatory 
                                                                                                             
website operator to disseminate much more information, at much 
lower cost, than a traditional publisher . . . .  In this way, those who 
enjoy commercial benefits from bringing together housing providers 
and housing seekers can cooperate to ensure that the anti-
discrimination laws are not violated. 
Id.  (internal citations omitted).  In Roommate, the Ninth Circuit noted that Roommates.com 
had about one hundred and fifty thousand active listings and received more than a million 
page views every day, but did not consider staffing issues in its holding.  521 F.3d 1157, 
1161 (9th Cir. 2008).  In Craigslist, however, the Seventh Circuit specifically addressed 
Craigslist’s understaffing and posited that the costs of maintaining editorial control over 
posts would be too burdensome.  519 F.3d at 668–69. 
 An online service could hire a staff to vet the postings, but that 
would be expensive. . . . .  Every month more than 30 million notices 
are posted to the [C]raigslist system.  Fewer than 30 people, all based 
in California, operate the system, which offers classifieds and forums 
for 450 cities.  It would be necessary to increase that staff (and the 
expense that the users must bear) substantially to conduct the sort of 
editorial review that [plaintiff] demands. 
Id. 
104 Chang, supra note 20, at 1007 (arguing that the FHA does not overburden interactive 
computer services and advocating the use of filtering technology).  Chang stated: 
 Because such clear guidelines exist as to words and combinations 
of words that would likely violate § 3604(c), [interactive computer 
services] could utilize available filtering technology to automatically 
prescreen discriminatory text-based housing listings while minimizing 
the need for manual review.  The same filtering technology currently 
used to block obscene language could be configured to block 
discriminatory words and phrases from classified housing listings. 
Id.  Chang concedes that the technology “is not foolproof and may be under- or 
overinclusive,” but suggests that the problem could be cured by utilizing advanced 
word-search techniques or by implementing a program that allows users to report 
discriminatory postings to the website operators.  Id.  But see Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 
668–69 (finding fault with automated filters).  “[S]creening, though lawful, is hard.  
Simple filters along the lines of ‘postings may not contain the words ‘white”’ can’t 
work. . . .  [A]utomated filters and human reviewers may be equally poor at sifting 
good from bad postings unless the discrimination is blatant; both false positives and 
false negatives are inevitable.”  Id.  Other commentators have suggested placing a 
banner advertisement on the user forum that contains the pertinent provisions of the 
FHA or creating drop down menus that only allow information permissible under the 
FHA.  Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 343.  But see Collins, supra note 24, at 1497–98 
(arguing that user-based notification programs may be ineffective because they do not 
eliminate the harm caused by a discriminatory advertisement during the time it is 
available to the public and the program assumes that users know what type of content 
constitutes discrimination under the FHA). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/9
2009] The New Frontier for Housing Discrimination 367 
advertisements because they are less likely to face liability if they take a 
hands-off approach.105  A do-nothing mentality allows some interactive 
computer services to shirk their ethical duty of ensuring that housing 
listings are non-discriminatory without fear of repercussion and directly 
contradicts the congressional intent behind the Good Samaritan 
provision.106 
3. Silence and Intent Treated as the Same 
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits erred by construing Congress’s 
silence as an indication that the FHA was not excluded from the CDA’s 
immunity provision.107  As it stands, the CDA effectively preempts 
Section 3604(c) of the FHA’s liability for intermediaries when interactive 
computer services are involved by providing near-absolute immunity for 
the intermediaries for clear FHA violations.108  In other contexts, the 
Supreme Court has attempted to adhere to the provisions of both 
statutes when resolving conflicts between two federal laws.109  Yet, even 
                                                 
105 Crossett, supra note 79, at 210 (arguing that the Good Samaritan provision promotes 
inefficiency).  Crossett asserts that “[b]ecause a website may avoid liability under the FHA 
by turning its website into a free-for-all (the less oversight, the greater chance of 
immunity), online housing consumers will be left to negotiate thousands of unfiltered 
advertisements, like on Craigslist.”  Id.  Crossett argues that this method is inefficient for 
both web-surfers and the companies who want to serve them and will ultimately lead to 
greater violations of the FHA.  Id.  See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Seventh Circuit’s questioning of the logic behind the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Zeran 
and the application that appeared to create a disincentive for interactive computer services 
to use filtering technology). 
106 Kurth, supra note 16, at 835.  “Congress used the terms ‘protection for blocking and 
screening’ seven times in the rather brief § 230 of the CDA.  This notion was at the heart of 
the legislation—that immunity was intended for those Web site hosts who made some 
good faith effort to curb malicious practices.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  See supra notes 47–51 
and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the CDA); infra Part III.B.3 
(expounding the shortcomings of the CDA’s application with regard to congressional 
intent). 
107 Chang, supra note 20, at 1001.  Chang argues that the congressional silence about the 
CDA’s implications on fair housing and the lack of an irreconcilable conflict between the 
laws means that the courts should adhere to the FHA’s broad imposition of liability.  Id.; 
infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text (arguing that congressional silence within the 
context of two federal laws should be treated the same way as when the situation involves 
a federal law and a state law). 
108 Supra note 24 and accompanying text (illustrating how the FHA’s expansive liability 
applies to both the principal discriminator and the intermediaries); supra Part II.D  
(discussing Roommate and Craigslist, two cases where the CDA’s immunity trumped FHA’s 
liability for intermediaries). 
109 Chang, supra note 20, at 1001 (arguing that the judiciary should attempt to give both 
statutes effect).  Also, in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) the Court held: 
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when a dispute arises as to whether a federal law was meant to preempt 
a particular area of state law, which under the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution must give way to conflicting federal law, 
courts still may apply preemption only where there is a clear 
congressional intent to preempt state law.110 
Applying this framework supports the argument that the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits erred in their analyses because Congress’s failure to 
contemplate the FHA while drafting the CDA is a far cry from clear 
congressional intent to preempt the FHA advertising provision in certain 
situations through application of the CDA.111  In Craigslist, the Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that the purpose of drafting a general statute was so the 
legislature need not “traipse through the United States Code” to consider 
all possible sources of liability and improperly treated congressional 
silence as intent to include the FHA within the CDA’s immunity 
provision.112  While the Ninth Circuit chose to address the issue of 
congressional intent through expressio unius est exclusio alterius in 
                                                                                                             
 In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to 
repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is 
when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable . . . .   
 The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among 
Congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed 
Congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.  
“When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give 
effect to both if possible” . . . .  The intention of the legislature to repeal 
“must be clear and manifest.” 
Id. at 550–51 (internal citations omitted).  Chang’s commentary provides an in-depth 
analysis of the possibility of reconciling the CDA and the FHA, ultimately concluding that 
the application of the FHA’s advertising provision to interactive computer services does 
not frustrate the purpose of the CDA.  See Chang, supra note 20, at 1003–08; see also Kurth, 
supra note 16, at 835 (arguing that the judiciary should solve the conflict by reading a good 
faith screening requirement into the Good Samaritan provision). 
110 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 366–67 (providing an overview of the Supreme 
Court’s preemption jurisprudence).  Chemerinsky explains: 
The problem, of course, is that Congress’s intent, especially as to the 
scope of preemption, is rarely expressed or clear.  Therefore, although 
the Court purports to be finding congressional intent, it often is left to 
make guesses about purpose based on fragments of statutory 
language, random statements in the legislative history, and the degree 
of detail of the federal regulation. 
Id. at 367. 
111 Supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (discussing the CDA’s legislative history). 
112 Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 
671 (7th Cir. 2008).  The Seventh Circuit perceived the question to be “not whether 
Congress gave any thought to the Fair Housing Act, but whether it excluded § 3604(c) 
from the reach of 230(c)(1).”  Id.  Cf. supra note 54 (discussing the Central District of 
California’s application of the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to the CDA). 
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Roommate, its reasoning was equally unsound because the FHA was not 
even on the congressional radar when the CDA and its exceptions were 
drafted.113  That said, the FHA was a landmark piece of legislation 
designed to protect compelling interests in equal housing opportunities, 
and nothing in the legislative history of the CDA remotely suggests that 
Congress actually intended the CDA to erase such an important step in 
equality by providing immunity for advertising violations, no matter 
their form.114  The legislative history of the CDA reveals several purposes 
behind the inclusion of the Good Samaritan provision, and, if anything, 
the congressional silence on the topic of its application to the FHA 
illustrates that Congress did not intend for the CDA to provide immunity 
for interactive computer services in their role as intermediaries for 
discriminatory housing advertisements.115 
                                                 
113 Supra note 54 (discussing the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its 
application in Roommate); notes 47–51 and accompanying text (providing an overview of 
the CDA’s legislative history). 
114 Supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text (discussing the history and purposes of the 
FHA); notes 47–51 and accompanying text (providing the legislative history of the CDA).  
Congress listed five policy reasons for enacting the CDA, one of which was “to remove 
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that 
empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2006).  The Good Samaritan provision fits squarely within 
that particular policy goal.  Furthermore, in Craigslist, the district court for the Northern 
District of Illinois recounted some of the goals Congress discussed as the CDA passed 
through the legislature, specifically that the statute “‘was enacted, in part, to maintain the 
robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government 
interference in the medium to a minimum.’”  Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under 
the Law v. Craigslist, Inc. 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 689 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (quoting Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997)).  The district court relied heavily on the 
Zeran court’s assessment that Congress was also concerned about the chilling effect that 
tort-based lawsuits have on free speech.  Id.; supra note 57 and accompanying text 
(providing a discussion of the Zeran courts discernment of the nongressional intent behind 
the CDA).  The district court also noted that Congress made the policy choice not to impose 
tort liability on intermediaries and reasoned that it would be impossible for interactive 
computer services to screen millions of messages.  See Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 689 
(reasoning that “‘Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and 
chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.’” (quoting Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 331)). 
115 Supra, notes 45–51 and accompanying text (explaining that in enacting the CDA, 
Congress was concerned with immunizing interactive computer services that utilized 
screening techniques to block offensive conduct and eliminating a flood of tort-based 
litigation in the wake of the decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)).  The notion that silence should not be construed by 
courts as indicative of Congressional intent is not unique to the conflict between the FHA 
and the CDA, as commentators have made similar arguments regarding other areas of law.  
See Levinson, supra note 80, at 796 (arguing that congressional silence about administrative 
or judicial remedies in a statute does not warrant an automatic inference that Congress 
intended to eliminate Section 1983 relief in conjunction with certain statues); Sullivan, supra 
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4. Victims May Be Denied a Remedy 
Those who support the CDA’s current dominance over the FHA 
argue that victims of housing discrimination are barred only from 
recovering from intermediary interactive computer services for third-
party online housing violations and that the avenue of recovery against 
the third-party discriminators remains available.116  While this argument 
is plausible, the ability to post anonymous messages on the Internet may 
leave victims of housing discrimination without a readily available 
defendant.117  The burdensome task of identifying interactive computer 
service users may prove to be so costly and time-consuming that victims 
of housing discrimination will be discouraged from pursuing a 
remedy.118  If a victim cannot obtain a violator’s identity on his or her 
                                                                                                             
note 80, at 299 (arguing that Congressional inaction should not preclude the Food and 
Drug Administration from regulating tobacco products); Bogen, supra note 80, at 1068 
(asserting that “[c]ongressional silence indicates nothing” when determining whether a 
state’s boycott of foreign goods is consistent with federal law). 
116 Supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (discussing the broad application of the 
FHA advertising provision); supra note 52 (containing the text of the Good Samaritan 
provision, which mentions only “interactive computer services” and not the third party 
discriminators). 
117 Kurth, supra note 16, at 828.  See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing 
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., a case in which an anonymous posting resulted in the plaintiff 
receiving a flood of angry phone calls); supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text 
(providing an explanation of Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., a case in which a woman 
received unsolicited phone calls from users of an online dating service because an 
anonymous user created a false advertisement using the woman’s name and likeness); 
supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing Stratton Oakmont, where an 
anonymous user posted allegedly defamatory statements about an investment banking 
company).  Kurth argues that the same type of instance could arise in the context of fair 
housing.  Kurth, supra note 16, at 828.  “[I]ndividuals who find individual user violations of 
the Fair Housing Act on Websites such as Craigslist would have to go through the 
burdensome task of affirmatively identifying the individuals who posted the questionable 
ads, which may have been posted anonymously, and then filing suit against each 
individual.”  Id. 
118 Kurth, supra note 16, at 828.  One commentator provided insight into how difficult it 
may be to identify a user of a website such as Craigslist or Roommates.com.  Collins, supra 
note 24, at 1494.  According to Collins: 
Although it is true that a housing advertisement must include contact 
information in order for prospective buyers and renters to express 
their interest, some [interactive computer services] protect their users’ 
anonymity by hiding their email addresses.  If an interested party 
wants to contact the person who posted an advertisement, he or she 
sends an email to a temporary, anonymous address that the 
[interactive computer service] specially created for the advertisement.  
The email is automatically forwarded from the anonymous email 
address to the user’s actual address.  The person responding to the 
advertisement never sees the advertiser’s actual contact information 
unless the advertiser responds via email.  In this way, online housing 
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own, the victim must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
and then pursue additional litigation to compel the disclosure of the 
defendant’s identity.119  Commentators suggest that the difficulty of 
identifying individual online discriminators is a key reason why 
interactive computer services should be held liable for their users’ 
discriminatory housing advertisements.120  Next, Section C explores and 
evaluates solutions posed by various legal commentators, focusing on 
the strengths, weaknesses, and policy concerns of each.121  
                                                                                                             
advertisers remain much more anonymous than traditional print 
advertisers, who generally have no choice but to provide an accurate 
phone number or email address. 
Id. 
119 Kurth, supra note 16, at 828.  Kurth argues that “potential plaintiffs might be deterred 
from filing lawsuits given the increased costs and the seeming impossibility of identifying 
the faceless Internet offender.”  Id.  The New Jersey Supreme Court is credited with 
positing the dominant analysis used when a plaintiff wishes to unmask an anonymous 
defendant.  Id.  The court produced the following analysis: 
 We offer the following guidelines to trial courts when faced with 
an application by a plaintiff for expedited discovery seeking an order 
compelling an ISP to honor a subpoena and disclose the identity of 
anonymous Internet posters who are sued for allegedly violating the 
rights of individuals, corporations or businesses . . .  
 [T]he trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake 
efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a 
subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold 
action to afford the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable 
opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application . . . . 
 The court shall also require the plaintiff to identify and set forth 
the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that 
plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech . . . . 
 The complaint and all information provided to the court should 
be carefully reviewed to determine whether plaintiff has set forth a 
prima facie cause of action against the fictitiously-named anonymous 
defendants . . . . 
 Finally, assuming the court concludes that the plaintiff has 
presented a prima facie cause of action, the court must balance the 
defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against 
the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the 
disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to allow the plaintiff 
to properly proceed. 
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. 2001). 
120 Kurth, supra note 16, at 828.  “[I]f Web sites such as Craigslist maintained a degree of 
control in preventing the publication of FHA-violative housing ads, offenders could be 
prevented from [disseminating] their discriminatory housing preferences on such major 
Internet databases.”  Id.  See Collins, supra note 24, at 1493–95 (arguing that interactive 
computer services are ideal candidates for gatekeeper liability because they are easier to 
identify than anonymous users and can utilize filtering systems to minimize violations). 
121 Infra Part III.C (discussing the suggestions of allowing the judiciary to solve the 
conflict between the FHA and the CDA, adding the FHA to the already developed 
exceptions list, and amending the text of Section 230(c)). 
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C. Weighing the Alternatives 
Although the application of the CDA to online FHA violations is a 
relatively new practice, three commentators present solutions to the 
conflict, which include allowing the courts to harmonize the FHA and 
the CDA by reading a good faith screening requirement into the text of 
the CDA, adding an FHA exception to Section 230(e), or revising Section 
230(c) to exclude FHA violations.122  One commentator suggests the 
judiciary can resolve the conflict between the CDA and the FHA by 
granting immunity to interactive computer services for third-party FHA 
advertising violations only after a showing of a good-faith effort to block 
the discriminatory content.123  This approach poses a minimal threat to 
free speech on the Internet and allows for a case-by-case analysis that 
adheres to the Supreme Court’s practice of trying to equally enforce 
conflicting federal statutes.124  Yet, this solution may not be viable in 
jurisdictions that firmly adhere to Zeran or shun the idea of judicial 
activism, as this approach overlooks the text of the law in favor of policy 
concerns.125 
In addition, two legal commentators who address the discourse 
between the CDA and the FHA concluded that Congress should resolve 
the conflict by amending the CDA, but posited revisions to different 
                                                 
122 Infra Part III.C. 
123 Kurth, supra note 16, at 834–35 (arguing that the suggested application also embodies 
the legislative intent behind the CDA and that “[w]ith this interpretation enunciated, courts 
could take individual cases on their facts to determine whether the challenged Website has 
met this standard and qualified for immunity”). 
124 Kurth, supra note 16, at 835 (noting that the judiciary’s case-by-case determination 
would result in restriction only for discriminatory housing advertisements).  Kurth asserts 
that “[t]he fact that a user who posts an ad seeking to rent an apartment to ‘Whites only’ 
. . . . might have that post removed by screening software, does not mean that the same 
user is not free to open his own Web site devoted to ‘White power.’”  Id.  See Chang, supra 
note 20, at 1001–08 (arguing that FHA liability should apply to interactive computer 
services because the FHA and CDA can be reconciled); supra note 109 and accompanying 
text (discussing the analysis used by the Supreme Court when the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act ran afoul of an older statute that allowed the Bureau of Indian Affairs to 
give a preference to Native Americans in its hiring decisions). 
125 Supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision and rationale in Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.).  While the Seventh 
Circuit questioned the Zeran court’s decision to construe the CDA in a way that conflicted 
with the statute’s subtitles, the contentions were posed in dicta, which has minimal 
persuasive power.  See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that the 
Good Samaritan provision seems to provide immunity to interactive computer services 
regardless of whether they attempt to screen offensive content); supra note 68 (providing a 
discussion of GTE Corp.).  Some justices, however, do not take a proactive stance and 
believe that their role is to follow the letter of the law, regardless of its illogical structure or 
impractical effects.  Supra note 94 (quoting then Chief Justice Burger’s famous dissent from 
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill). 
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sections of the statute.126  One author suggests in his 2007 Note that 
Congress should add the FHA to Section 230(e), an explicit list of 
exceptions to the CDA.127  While creating a special exception for the FHA 
has some of the same strengths as Kurth’s proposition (suggesting the 
Court could resolve the conflict through a new interpretation of the 
CDA) and would likely be the quickest resolution to the conflict, it is a 
reactive step that ignores the CDA’s textual shortcomings.128 
Another commentator advocates the creation of an exception for the 
FHA by combining elements of the CDA and FHA in a specific revision 
to the text of Section 230(c)(1).129  Although this suggestion is a viable 
solution to the conflict between the CDA and the FHA, it contains the 
same deficiencies as Shanahan’s proposal.130  Furthermore, Collins 
recognizes that his solution is subject to several criticisms, including 
overreaction by interactive computer services, overburdening interactive 
computer services, and Congress’s acceptance of Zeran’s broad grant of 
immunity.131  Finally, Part IV of this Note suggests a remedy to the 
conflict between the FHA and the CDA—revisions to Section 230(c)(1) 
                                                 
126 Shanahan, supra note 22, at 155 (recommending that Congress add the FHA to the list 
of exceptions in the CDA); Collins, supra note 24, at 1495 (proposing a revision to Section 
230(c)(1) that would create an exception for the FHA). 
127 Shanahan, supra note 22, at 155.  For the text of Section 230(e) see supra note 54. 
128 Kurth, supra note 16, at 834–35 (suggesting that the judiciary can solve the conflict 
through a new interpretation of the CDA); supra note 124 and accompanying text 
(providing a discussion of the strengths of Kurth’s solution).  See supra notes 69–70 and 
accompanying text (discussing the inconsistencies between the subtitles of the CDA and its 
application in FHA cases); supra Part III.B.3 (analyzing how the judiciary’s application of 
the CDA mistakenly construes congressional silence and is contrary to the CDA’s 
legislative intent). 
129 Collins, supra note 24, at 1495.  Collins argues that Section 230(c)(1) should read “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, except for 
notices, statements, or advertisements with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.”  Id. 
130 Supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the weaknesses in adding the FHA 
to the Section 230(e) exception list). 
131 Collins, supra note 24, at 1495–98.  Collins also presents counterarguments to the 
perceived weaknesses in his suggested statutory revision.  Id.  He acknowledges that 
interactive computer services may become overzealous in their blocking of potentially 
discriminatory content, but that the practice can be overcome by allowing users to revise 
their screened advertisements in a manner consistent with Section 3604(c).  Id. at 1496.  
Collins negates the argument that interactive computer services might be overburdened by 
noting that they would be held to the same legal standard as traditional print media.  Id. at 
1497; see supra note 24 (providing several cases imposing FHA liability on newspapers, 
listing services, and advertising brochures).  Lastly, Collins considers whether Congress 
had accepted Zeran by passing the Dot Kids Act, but concludes that the new legislation has 
no bearing on the CDA and does not constitute acceptance of Zeran.  Id. at 1498. 
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that clarify the scope of its application, are proactive in nature, and avoid 
the pitfalls inherent in other proposed solutions.132 
IV.  PROPOSED REVISION 
Although some scholars suggest revising the CDA to create an 
exception for FHA violations, a more appropriate revision is needed, one 
that eliminates exceptions and refines the text of the Good Samaritan 
provision to state its intended use.133  First, the list of exceptions in 
Section 230(e) of the CDA should be stricken.134  A list of exceptions, 
such as the one currently included in the CDA, opens the door to 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a canon of statutory construction that 
assumes any item not on the list was intentionally excluded by 
Congress.135  Yet, such an assumption is erroneous when exclusion 
results from mere oversight as opposed to intent.136  Rather than include 
a list of exceptions, Congress can accomplish the same end by adding a 
provision to Section 230(c) that limits its application to only those 
instances included within the CDA’s text.137 
The Author’s proposed resolution is centered on the following 
revisions to the Good Samaritan provision of the CDA: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material 
 (1) Treatment of publisher or speaker: 
 For the purposes of determining defamation liability, 
[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or 
                                                 
132 Infra Part IV (suggesting a revision to Section 230(c)(1) that is consistent with 
congressional intent and limits the application of the Good Samaritan provision). 
133 Infra Part IV (explaining this Author’s proposed revisions to the CDA); see supra Part 
III.C (analyzing solutions posed by other legal scholars, including adding the FHA to the 
exceptions list under Section 230(e), revising the Good Samaritan provision to include an 
exception for the FHA, and allowing the judiciary to resolve the conflict through a new 
interpretation of the CDA). 
134 Supra note 54 (containing the text of 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2006), which includes 
exceptions for specific criminal provisions, intellectual property laws, consistent state laws, 
and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act). 
135 Supra note 54 and accompanying text (providing Sutherland’s description of the canon 
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and illustrating how the Ninth Circuit applied it to the 
CDA). 
136 Supra Part III.B.3 (arguing that congressional silence should not be construed as 
intent). 
137 Infra note 138 and accompanying text (containing the Author’s proposed revisions to 
the Good Samaritan provisions). 
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speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.  
 (2) Other [c]ivil liability: 
 No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action [] taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, 
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available 
to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (A). 
(C) “Any action taken in good faith” as used in 
paragraph (A) means filtering software, specialized 
search engines, a reporting scheme, or any other 
method reasonably calculated to restrict access to the 
material described in paragraph (A). 
 (3) This provision shall have no other applications aside 
from those provided in paragraphs (1) and (2).138 
Commentary 
This framework allows for clearer application of the Good Samaritan 
provision and is more compatible with the congressional intent behind 
the enactment of the CDA because it provides immunity for defamatory 
statements posted by third parties, immunizes interactive computer 
services that make a good-faith attempt to screen offensive content, and 
limits the application of the CDA to only the uses provided within the 
text.139  The revisions proposed to Section 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) draw a 
distinct line between the two subsections and eliminate the confusion 
associated with determining how the two subsections interact with each 
other.140 
Under the Author’s suggested revisions, Section 230(c)(1) would 
unequivocally prevent interactive computer services from being treated 
                                                 
138 The Author’s original revisions are italicized.  The remainder of the statutory text is 
from 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
139 Supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text (discussing Congresses intent behind the 
enactment of the CDA). 
140 Supra note 77 (providing the district court for the Northern District of Illinois’s 
analysis of the interaction between Sections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2)). 
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as publishers of content provided by third parties only in defamation 
actions.141  The revisions to Section 230(c)(1) are designed to provide 
absolute immunity in defamation actions while striking an adequate 
balance between the unfair imposition of liability on interactive 
computer services and censorship on the Internet.142 
The proposed revisions of Section 230(c)(2) provide civil immunity, 
most likely from First Amendment claims, for interactive computer 
services that make a good-faith effort to restrict access to patently 
offensive or obscene materials on their websites or forums.143  Even 
though Rachel Kurth’s position that a good-faith effort to restrict 
offensive content should be an implied requirement for immunity, this 
Note concludes that making the requirement explicit in the statute is 
preferable to creative statutory interpretation by the ever-changing 
judiciary.144  The proposed revisions of Section 230(c)(2)(C) reinforce the 
“good faith” requirement by providing examples of means available to 
restrict content.145  Nevertheless, the phrase “reasonably calculated to 
restrict access” allows for flexibility to account for the financial 
capabilities of individual interactive computer services.146  Lastly, the 
proposed addition of Section 230(c)(3) to the CDA replaces the need for a 
list of exceptions by clearly stating the Good Samaritan provision shall 
have no use other than those listed in Section 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2).147 
This Note’s suggested revisions serve two purposes:  (1) eliminating 
near-absolute immunity provided to interactive computer services for 
third-party FHA violations and (2) providing a proactive solution to the 
current conflict that is workable for future lawmakers.  While adding the 
FHA to the exceptions list in Section 230(e) or amending the text in 
Section 230(c) to create an exception for the FHA would solve the current 
                                                 
141 Supra text accompanying note 138 (containing the Author’s proposed revisions to the 
Good Samaritan provision); supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), a case in 
which an Internet service provider was held liable for defamatory messages posted by 
third parties on its “Money Talk” message board). 
142 Supra text accompanying note 138 (providing the Author’s suggested revisions to the 
CDA); see 141 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (noting Congressional concern for 
the protection of free speech on the Internet). 
143 Supra text accompanying note 138 (containing the Author’s proposed statutory 
solution to the conflict between the CDA and the FHA). 
144 Kurth, supra note 16, at 834–35 (arguing the judiciary should be allowed to read a 
good faith requirement into the current text of the CDA). 
145 Supra text accompanying note 138 (listing the Author’s proposed changes to the 
CDA). 
146 Supra text accompanying note 138 (listing this author’s proposed changes to the 
CDA). 
147 Supra text accompanying note 138 (listing this author’s proposed changes to the 
CDA). 
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conflict between the FHA and the CDA, the Author’s proposed revisions 
of Section 230(c) also contemplate the potential for future misuses of the 
CDA.148  With such a vast array of bills and a limited amount of time 
during any given legislative session, it is unreasonable to assume that 
Congress could ever contemplate every possible misuse of a given 
statutory provision.149  Rather than wasting congressional time and 
resources amending the CDA each time a defendant attempts to utilize 
the CDA in an unforeseen manner, new applications are presumed 
invalid under the proposed amendment to the statute.150  While 
Congress may always amend any portion of the CDA that no longer 
serves its purpose or is inconsistent with contemporary attitudes and 
needs, the proposed revisions to the CDA encourage efficiency in 
drafting, which eliminates the need for the same provision to be 
repeatedly amended after its initial passage.151  Furthermore, the 
proposed revisions put the application of the CDA in the hands of 
Congress instead of the judiciary and allows for harmonious coexistence 
between the FHA and the CDA.152 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Housing discrimination is an egregious form of prejudice that 
perpetuates stereotypes and causes psychological harm.  Despite 
congressional efforts to eliminate the expression of such prejudices 
through the enactment of the FHA, housing discrimination remains 
prevalent on the Internet.  Although a provision of the FHA extends 
liability for discriminatory housing advertisements to intermediaries, 
defendants have successfully used the Good Samaritan provision of the 
CDA to immunize interactive computer services from liability for third-
party FHA violations posted on their websites and forums. 
The CDA was enacted more than twenty-five years after the FHA, 
but congressional documents indicate that the legislators never 
contemplated a potential conflict between the FHA and the CDA.  The 
CDA, a law that was intended to prevent a flood of defamation litigation 
and protect interactive computer services that make a good-faith effort to 
                                                 
148 Supra Part III.C (presenting and analyzing alternative solutions to the conflict between 
the CDA and the FHA proposed by various scholars). 
149 Supra Part II.C (discussing the enactment of the CDA). 
150 Supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress did not foresee the 
conflict between the CDA and the FHA when it enacted the CDA). 
151 Supra text accompanying note 138 (containing the Author’s proposed revisions to the 
CDA). 
152 Supra text accompanying note 138 (containing this author’s proposed revisions to the 
CDA). 
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screen sexually explicit or offensive materials, has effectively eviscerated 
the advertising provision of the FHA and left victims of housing 
discrimination without a form of recovery for online FHA violations. 
The Good Samaritan provision has several textual flaws, allowing 
for immunity broader than that envisioned by Congress and creating 
confusion as to how its two subparts should interact.  These flaws could 
be cured by revisions that clarify how and when the CDA should apply.  
Furthermore, the addition of a clause limiting the application of the 
Good Samaritan provision only to those instances listed in the statute 
closes the door on the use of the CDA to protect interactive computer 
services from third-party FHA violations, as well as protects against 
future misuses of the CDA.  
The judiciary cannot avoid affording immunity to interactive 
computer services for third-party FHA violations because the current 
text of the CDA demands such immunity.  Rather than encourage the 
judiciary to engage in extreme activism in the name of public policy, the 
Author argues that the resolution to the conflict between the CDA and 
FHA is a textual revision by Congress and encourages legislators to draft 
statutes that clarify the intent behind their enactment.  While a policy 
section provides some insight to future interpreters, legislators should 
strive to ensure that the substantive text of the law also embodies the 
specific intent of the statute. 
Although those who wish to engage in housing discrimination have 
taken advantage of the Internet as their new frontier, Congress has the 
power to force interactive computer services to take responsibility for the 
content on their websites and forums and to prevent the Internet from 
serving as a catalyst of reversion to the same deplorable attitudes and 
housing prejudices that plagued America more than half a century ago. 
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